


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JANUARY – MARCH 2025

RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

Periodic report based on
monitoring materials from
selected regions of Ukraine

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This report was drafted by the team of the Ukrainian Independent Center for Political Research (UCIPR) as part of the activities of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion (National Platform). This civic initiative was launched in February 2018 (formerly known as the National Platform “Dialogue on Peace and Secure Reintegration”).

The National Platform’s activities are geared towards strengthening the national resilience of Ukraine. This could be done through establishing dialogue practices in society, providing the authorities with proposals for developing relevant policies, particularly those on resilience and social cohesion as well as ensuring public awareness of these processes. The initiative has been implemented with the financial support of the European Union as part of “Sustaining the Resilience of Ukraine towards the Emerging Risks and Consequences of the War” project.

The report is based on data on events in 11 oblasts of Ukraine which are important for shaping a policy of national resilience. The project target oblasts were selected based on analysis of changes in cohesion of local populations due to the outbreak of military operations and include Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv, and Zakarpattia oblasts. For data collection, we distinguish between the temporarily occupied areas, frontline and deoccupied areas, and relatively rear areas.

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The product content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.

The text of the report is available for download on the websites of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion <http://national-platform.org> and UCIPR www.ucipr.org.ua.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFU	Armed Forces of Ukraine
ASC	Administrative Services Centre
CMA	City Military Administration
GAB	Guided Aerial Bomb
DPR	«Donetsk People Republic»
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
LPR	«Luhansk People Republic»
OCU	Orthodox Church of Ukraine
OMA	Oblast Military Administration
RF	Russian Federation
TOA	Temporarily Occupied Area
TRSSC	Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centre
UN	United Nations Organization
UOC (MP)	Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

SUMMARY

The situation at the front line

From January through March 2025, the situation at the front line remained tense, with heavy fighting taking place in several areas. Russian troops advanced along the eastern and southern fronts.

In January, Ukraine's key territorial losses were **Kurakhove** and **Velyka Novoselivka, Donetsk oblast**. The Russian Federation announced taking control of Kurakhove on January 6 and the complete occupation of Velyka Novoselivka on January 26. Although the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine did not confirm the withdrawal of troops from those population centres, no mention of their defence was made in official reports. The capture of both population centres was a result of an ongoing offensive by the Russian army over several months. Along with that, the tempo of the enemy's advance slowed following those tactical successes.

In February, the Defence Forces of Ukraine significantly improved their positions near **Pokrovsk**. Kotlyne, Pishchane, and Lysivka villages were liberated, which forced Russian troops to take up defence along that axis. Additionally, a new defence line of about 30 km was built on Pokrovsk front, which not only strengthens the security of the city but also restrains the enemy's possible advance towards Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

Heavy fighting continued in **Toretsk** in densely built-up areas. Unable to advance through the streets, the Russians attempted to infiltrate the rear of Ukrainian defenders through underground communications, including sewage systems, which posed additional tactical risks for the Defence Forces.

The situation in **Chasiv Yar** was dynamic, with rapid changes on the line of contact. The city was almost destroyed. Fiber-optic drones which cannot be jammed by electronic warfare systems remained one of the greatest threats to the Ukrainian army. Moreover, the attackers increasingly used GABs.

Russian troops continued their attacks on Vovchansk and Lipetsk fronts, with more active advance recorded near **Kupiansk** and **Dvorichna**. Russian troops held control of the left bank of the Oskil River and attempted to break through Ukrainian positions. According to the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, up to 150 armed clashes were reported in that area daily.

The most important event in Luhansk oblast was the recapture of **Nadiia** village west of Svatove. The control of the AFU of Nadiia makes it difficult for the enemy to manoeuvre towards Raihorodok, Dzherelne, Kopanki, Zelenyi Hai, and Borova. Along with that, 95% of the territory of Luhansk oblast was under temporary occupation. Heavy fighting was ongoing in 16 population centres of Siverskodonetsk and Svatove raions.

The combat situation in Kherson oblast remained tense. The aggressor attempted to cross the Dnipro River and establish a foothold on its right bank. Furthermore, Russian forces systematically fired at the riverside area from aircraft and artillery to create a so-called dead zone where the AFU could not gain a foothold. According to Ukraine's Southern Defence Forces, the daily number of shelling and assault operations at the front line along the Dnipro increased dramatically.

Russian troops attempted to break through the AFU's defence line on Zaporizhzhia front near **Lobkove** and **Stepove**. Despite an increase in the number of strikes, the Ukrainian Defence Forces successfully repelled the enemy's attacks. The capture of these population centres would enable the Russians to shell the outskirts of Zaporizhzhia and to control important logistical routes, which in turn would significantly complicate the situation at the front line.

Temporarily occupied areas

Russia continued to extensively integrate the temporarily occupied areas into its economic and legal context through increasing pressure on and control of the local population. Forced passporting has remained a key tool of this process: persons without Russian citizenship lose the right to pensions, social benefits as well as access to health care, postal, and other basic services.

In those areas, the political subjectivity of the local population was systematically eliminated – locals are almost not represented in authorities and are deprived of the opportunity to influence decision-making through participatory mechanisms. In parallel to that, targeted resettlement of citizens from other regions of the RF was under way.

The occupying authorities also continued to seize the property of Ukrainians who relocated from the temporarily occupied areas. They used such tools as housing inventory and nationalisation of immovable property to be later provided to those loyal to the regime.

At the same time, destroyed properties of locals were practically not recovered. Instead, priority was given to the construction of mortgage housing accessible primarily to migrants from the 'canonical' Russian regions.

A hike in utility prices, gradually approaching those of central Russia, put an additional financial burden on the population and increased social tensions amid the general deterioration of the economic situation.

In March, the IAEA managed to rotate its team of experts at the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP via Russia-seized areas without Ukraine's consent. For the first time, the rotation route ran through the territory of the RF.

A systemic transformation was reported in the educational and scientific space of the temporarily occupied areas – higher education institutions were either closed or merged with Russian ones. The system of education was actively used as a tool of militarisation and ideological influence through making military subjects part of school curriculum and imposing a one-sided interpretation of history and pseudo-patriotic narratives. Schools and childcare facilities were turned into means of shaping a distorted identity and glorifying those involved in war crimes.

Frontline and deoccupied areas

Frontline communities were under constant shelling by Russian troops. The enemy launched daily attacks using all types of weapons, including drones that targeted civilians, public transport, emergency services, and critical infrastructure facilities. An atmosphere of constant anxiety and fear prevailed among the population due to a lack of security.

Social cohesion in those areas was seriously challenged by a combination of military threats, economic difficulties, demographic crisis, and loss of trust in authorities. Along with that, local authorities demonstrated efficient operation of utility companies which carried out rapid repairs of electricity, water, and heating systems. An important positive trend was extensive demining of agricultural lands. However, amid unstable funding and declining international support, those achievements remained far below the needs.

Law enforcement agencies consistently documented cases of collaborationism and ensured that those collaborating with the enemy in occupying authorities were held accountable.

Amid the general tension, a revival of political life was reported presumably due to preparations for an election cycle. Personnel changes in military administrations, intra-party reshuffles, and attempts to discredit opposition forces marked efforts to shape a controlled political environment.

Even under constant shelling, many residents remained in their homes and refused to evacuate, often because of a lack of alternatives. The absence of viable government solutions, such as affordable housing, sustainable assistance, or new job opportunities, deterred people from evacuating. As a result, the level of social tensions and discontent was growing in communities which were barely surviving in times of crisis.

A sudden and unexpected freeze on funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) seriously affected local communities, as they had lost support in critical areas, including infrastructure, agriculture, irrigation systems, repairs, and health care.

Relatively rear areas controlled by the Ukrainian government

Throughout the initial three months of 2025, local authorities in the rear areas focused their efforts on ensuring the viability of communities, providing the AFU with material and technical resources and financial contributions. Communities actively participated in a nation-wide initiative, *Shoulder to Shoulder: Cohesive Communities*, geared towards supporting frontline communities.

At the same time, public activities of representatives of local self-government bodies and MPs included preparation for a potential election cycle manifested in the efforts to mobilise the support of the population.

March was marked by an increase in attacks on the relatively rear areas, notably Odesa oblast. At least 13 massive attacks using drones, missiles, and artillery caused heavy damage to critical, port and civilian infrastructure facilities. Despite the constant threat, the oblast demonstrated a high capacity for recovery: emergency services, utilities, and volunteer initiatives rapidly responded to the consequences of the shelling.

The 11 March terrorist attack near the railway station in Ivano-Frankivsk sparked a loud public outcry. According to law enforcement agencies, the attack was orchestrated by Russian agents who used local teens as tool of sabotage. The incident has drawn increasing attention even in the rear areas.

Aid to IDPs was provided in close partnership with local authorities, civil society organisations, and international charitable foundations. The main challenges included providing subsidised housing, meeting the needs of people with disabilities, and encouraging employment of socially vulnerable groups.

Aid to veterans and families of fallen soldiers became increasingly important. It required a significant expansion of financial support, consolidation of efforts of the government, local authorities, and civil society organisations. Creating a social environment conducive to the integration and support of veteran communities was an important task.

The judgement by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) on the events of 2 May 2014 in Odesa has once again raised the complex issue of regional memory. Tensions were growing amid discussions of decolonisation, language politics, and multiculturalism. Some Odesa locals perceived the dismantling of imperial monuments as a loss of urban identity. This created a basis for information manipulation and increased polarisation in society, particularly in the media.

Public sentiment was characterised by war fatigue, social pessimism, and discontent with authorities. The number of cases of evasion of mobilisation and absence without leave was increasing.

A freeze on funding from the United States Agency for International Development, which considerably reduced the capacity of civil society organisations and charitable foundations in the government-controlled oblasts of Ukraine, posed a challenge for civil society. Despite that, civic initiatives actively sought alternative funding sources calling on the business sector, local authorities, and communities to join efforts to preserve pivotal social projects.

I. TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS

The occupying authorities [claimed](#) that the integration of the occupied areas into Russia's legal context was almost completed. According to the Russian Minister of Justice, Konstantin Chuychenko, the system of governance fully compliant with Russian standards has been set up in the occupied areas at a variety of levels. The Russian notary and bar system has also been put in place. Residents of the occupied areas receive all documents meeting Russian standards. Furthermore, the law enforcement, judicial, and penal systems have been established.

1. Changes in the system of governance

In Russia-occupied Luhansk oblast, the occupying authorities [continued](#) reshuffles in the local 'leadership' by eliminating former Ukrainian politicians who had defected to the Russian Federation in 2014. Specifically, the Head of the occupying administration of Siverskodonetsk, Mykola Morgunov, was detained on [accusations](#) of being involved in 11 murders, 6 abductions, 4 robberies and 2 cases of extortion. To replace the removed stooges, Moscow appointed either former militants of the so-called LPR having a reputation of 'defenders of the Russian world' or little-known officials.

Also, the trend of increasing influence of governors from Russia continued in the TOAs. A native of Angarsk and former Mayor of Irkutsk, Dmitry Berdnikov, [was promoted](#) to the so-called First Deputy Governor of the breakaway DPR. The so-called former Deputy Prime Minister of the self-proclaimed DPR and Khabarovsk native, Mikhail Sanakoev, was appointed in 2025 to the additional position of Finance Minister of the so-called DPR.

Overall, since the beginning of the occupation, senior positions in the so-called administrations of temporarily occupied Donetsk oblast have mostly been held by people from Russia. Denis Pushilin is the only local official who has been holding a high-ranking position. This policy shows the Kremlin's distrust of the local population and its desire to accelerate assimilation of the occupied areas in a supervised manner.

1.1. Decisions of occupying authorities

>> FORCED PASSPORTING

On 20 March 2025, Russian President Vladimir Putin [signed](#) the Decree No. 159 "On the peculiarities of the legal status of certain categories of foreigners and stateless persons in the Russian Federation amending and annulling certain decrees of the President of the Russian Federation" which obliges Ukrainian nationals "who do not have legal grounds for stay (residence) in the Russian Federation" to leave its territory by 10 September 2025. The requirement also applies to Russia-occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts and to the annexed Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The Institute for the Study of War [emphasised](#) that those measures could be used for the collection of personal data, coerced collaboration with the occupying authorities, and forced deportation.

It has to be mentioned that passporting was forced: individuals who had failed to acquire Russian citizenship lost the right to pensions, social benefits as well as access to health care, postal, and other basic services.

>> ASSIMILATION POLICY AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN THE RUSSIA-OCCUPIED AREAS

The Russia-installed administrations continued the policy of assimilation of the local population of the TOAs, in particular by massively importing workers from Russia's depressed regions. In the occupied part of the Luhansk oblast, the so-called Ministry of Labour and Social Policy [signed](#) agreements with Russia's republics of Altai, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Kalmykia, North Ossetia-Alania, and Chechnya which sent candidates for work to the occupied cities. This shows two main trends. First, the local population does not want to cooperate with occupying administrations, which results in a shortage of personnel. Second, a massive resettlement of people loyal to the RF is part of a strategy for changing the demographic composition and Russifying the oblast.

>> ZAPORIZHZHIA NPP

In March, the scheduled [rotation](#) of the IAEA mission to Russia-controlled Zaporizhzhia NPP took place via Russia-seized areas without Ukraine's consent. For the first time, the rotation route ran through the territory of the RF. In response, the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs strongly [condemned](#) such actions and sent an official note of protest against the rotation of the Agency staff from Zaporizhzhia NPP through the occupied areas. On 5 February, the IAEA had to postpone the rotation of its team of experts due to a lack of security guarantees from Russia.

In March 2025, the Russia-installed courts sentenced two workers of Zaporizhzhia NPP on charges of terrorism and alleged collaboration with Ukraine's Security Service. [Serhii Potynh](#), a safety engineer at Zaporizhzhia NPP, was sentenced to 19 years in prison for allegedly attempting to blow up the car of a Russian law enforcement officer. He was abducted back in June 2023 and has been held captive since then. In early March, a 56-year-old [Nataliia Shulha](#), another Zaporizhzhia NPP worker, was sentenced to 15 years in prison on accusations of attempted sabotage. These cases show an increase in repression against Ukrainian workers at the strategic facility, which raises concerns over human rights in the TOAs. [According to](#) the Enerhodar Mayor, 12 locals of the city are known to have been imprisoned by the Russians, including 11 Ukrainian nuclear engineers.

>> BANKING INSTITUTIONS

Russian banks continued to ramp up their presence in the Ukrainian TOAs. In February, payment terminals and ATMs of the Russian T-Bank [started operating](#) in the occupied areas of Donetsk oblast. Earlier, Promsvyazbank, VTB, and Sberbank had opened their branches there.

>> UNLAWFUL TAKEOVER OF UKRAINIAN BUSINESSES / RESOURCES

The occupiers [adopted](#) a strategy for closing loss-making mines in the breakaway LPR. According to Luhansk OMA, the Russian government's strategy involves the decommissioning of mines operating under unfavourable mining and geological conditions and those with high accident risk. The occupiers believe this will contribute to the territorial development, but in fact, these mines are being transferred to investors for next to nothing.

The Russian occupying authorities decided to utilise the capacities of Kadiivka Railway Car Building Works and Luhansk Aircraft Repair Plant for defence purposes. [According to](#) Luhansk OMA, the decision was motivated, among other things, by the use of cheap labour in the occupied areas.

The Russian invaders are going to [complete the inventory](#) of agricultural lands in Luhansk oblast by 1 December 2025. According to occupation resources, 19% of the total land area was inventoried as of February. The occupiers planned to survey more than 1.2 million hectares of land to identify ownerless land parcels, which would enable them to conclude long-term contracts.

In 2024, the Russians [took away](#) over 11,000 tons of fish and other marine resources from Ukraine's occupied areas to the RF. According to the invaders, the extraction of aquatic biological resources has increased by 2,700 tons over the past three years. However, fishing in the Sea of Azov has become especially dangerous following an environmental disaster due to a fuel oil spill, which led to a massive death of marine species and a threat to the marine ecosystem.

>> INFRASTRUCTURE CONSTRUCTION

The occupying authorities continued to demonstrate complete inaction regarding the rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities in the occupied areas even a year or two after their occupation. An example of inaction is the [village of Pisky](#), Donetsk oblast, occupied in 2022 where the consequences of the destruction have not been eliminated so far. The situation in [Krasnohorivka](#) is no better: the city is almost completely destroyed and has no electricity, water or communication. The rehabilitation of infrastructure facilities is stalling even in Mariupol. [It turned out](#) that only 71 houses are scheduled to be built in the city to provide apartments for those who lost their homes during the war. Of that number, 64 houses for 4,789 apartments have already been put into operation. In the meantime, at least 930 houses were destroyed during the war, [according to](#) the Ukrainian leadership of the city. Hence, the invaders intend to provide restitution for destroyed immovable property only to a quarter of those who lost their homes as a result of Russia's aggression.

The Russia-installed authorities have extensively exploited the myth of 'Donbas's recovery' to embezzle budget funds, as is clearly seen in the example of Brianka, Luhansk oblast. [According to](#) Luhansk OMA, over RUB 2.2 billion, or approximately EUR 24 million, was spent on the 'reconstruction' of the city which was not destroyed either in 2014 or during the full-scale invasion of 2022, apart from this year's allocation worth another RUB 653 million, or approximately EUR 7.1 million. Notwithstanding the absence of war damage, Brianka is officially included in 'reconstruction programmes along with half-destroyed Rubizhne, Lysychansk, and Siverskodonetsk. Luhansk OMA underscored that such practice means nothing but large-scale corruption schemes when funding is used under the guise of works which are not needed.

>> 'NATIONALISATION' / REGISTRATION / INVENTORY OF HOUSING

The occupying authorities in the TOAs continued to pursue a consistent policy of forced confiscation of private property from those who fled to the Ukrainian government-controlled areas or to countries which Russia views as unfriendly. In January 2025, the so-called Head of the self-proclaimed DPR, Denis Pushilin, [proposed to adopt](#) a draft law that would allow authorities to confiscate housing based on the decision of special commissions and without a trial. The confiscated property is to be subsequently transferred for use as interim housing to provide temporary accommodations for people experiencing homelessness. Although the possibility of property return is formally provided for in the event of return of the owner, this is almost impossible in practice without applying for Russian citizenship and going through the complex naturalisation process.

The proposed mechanism of confiscation supplements the current practice of housing inventory when the so-called ownerless premises are subject to nationalisation. The occupying authorities use the threat of confiscation as a tool of pressure on owners to force them to return to the occupied areas.

In the temporarily occupied left-bank areas of Kherson oblast, the breakaway authorities decided to nationalise property of those who have 'demonstrated aggression' towards Russia, the so-called Minister of Property and Land Relations of Kherson oblast, Elena Pekova, [said](#) to the Russian media. However, she did not explain what actions are considered aggressive.

The occupying authorities of temporarily occupied Berdiansk, Zaporizhzhia oblast, [launched](#) the process of distributing illegally nationalised housing of the locals who were forced to leave the city or lost their properties due to the actions of the occupiers. Under the guise of a programme for improving housing conditions for particular groups of the population, the invaders started collecting applications for housing in an effort to create an illusion of lawfulness of that process through bureaucratic procedures and requirements for documentary evidence of the 'right' to use the seized property.

Since no new housing was built there, the only source of housing was apartments and houses abandoned by their owners following a mass exodus of the population. Earlier, the occupying administration carried out a large-scale 'inventory' of immovable properties, which became the basis for further alienation of property in favour of individuals loyal to the regime.

In temporarily occupied Berdiansk, the Russia-installed authorities [destroyed](#) some archival documents, because they were in Ukrainian. Those included property ownership registers, land deeds, and urban planning documents. According to the Yellow Ribbon resistance movement, the occupying authorities refused to translate

the documents into Russian and decided to simply burn them, which effectively deprives the legitimate owners of the opportunity to provide evidence of ownership for immovable properties and land parcels.

On 14 March, Vladimir Putin [signed](#) a decree banning the registration of immovable properties of nationals of '[unfriendly countries](#)', notably Ukrainians, in the TOAs of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts until 1 January 2028 except in cases of a special permit. A special permit can be obtained by foreigners who serve or have served in the Russian army as well as their families.

In 2025, Rosreestr is going to [carry out](#) a 'comprehensive inventory of immovable properties' in 11 administrative units of the so-called LPR, including Alchevsk, Luhansk, Bilovodsk, Bilokurakyn, Lutuhyne, Markivka, Milove, Novoaidar, Novopskov, Stanytsia Luhanska, and Starobilsk 'municipal districts'. The occupiers will check technical characteristics of properties, establish or update data on right holders, and identify allegedly abandoned land plots and buildings. Although official explanation for these activities is the establishment of an 'accurate register' to place immovable properties into circulation, the inventory in fact serves as a tool for the further forced seizure of property from people who have fled the occupied areas or are unable to protect their rights.

>> **TARIFFS**

In the occupied areas of Donetsk oblast, discontent has been growing over an increase in utility prices approaching the average level in Russia. From July 2025 onwards, utility tariffs [will hike](#) by a quarter. Earlier, low utility prices were one of the key advantages emphasised by the occupying administration among the benefits of living in the breakaway People's Republics. However, following their annexation, prices were brought in line with the Russian level, which led to increased costs for the local population.

>> **ENHANCED CONTROL OF MOBILE PHONE USERS**

A large-scale campaign was launched in the occupied areas to update information about users of Phoenix mobile operator, the only one in the occupied part of Donetsk oblast. All users who purchased SIM cards using Ukrainian passports or other identity documents [should have](#) their Russian SIM cards re-registered by 1 July 2025. This will help SIM cards to be tied to Russian passports, which will further facilitate control of the population. The new requirements sparked panic among the locals, many of whom tried to re-register through branded stores, thus blocking their operation. The occupying authorities said that the registration procedure would be [available online](#).

At the same time, the Russia-installed authorities of the self-proclaimed LPR planned to block mobile numbers of those who fail to update their personal data. To retain the number, it is necessary to have a Russian passport and contact communication operators. Changes in Russia's legislation came into force on 1 January 2025. The so-called LPR also suspended the sale, re-registration, and renewal of SIM cards for foreigners and stateless persons.

>> **ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS**

An [oil slick](#) was discovered in the Sea of Azov near temporarily occupied Berdiansk threatening to unleash a new environmental catastrophe. Fuel oil spilled from [two Russian oil tankers](#) wrecked in the Kerch Strait on 15 December 2024 resulting in the massive death of marine species and the contamination of more than 27 km of the coastline. The leaked fuel oil near Berdiansk was discovered on 7 January, but the occupying authorities responded only a week later.

The oil spill contaminated the beaches and the territory of Berdiansk sanatorium and led to the death of many dolphins and shellfish. The locals cleaned the coast on their own, exposing themselves to danger. The disaster has become a yet another example of damage to the flora and fauna of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea as well as to the health of the local population caused by Russia's actions.

2. Humanitarian situation

[According to](#) Luhansk OMA, over 8,000 km of water supply networks in the self-proclaimed LPR were in a state of emergency, which is more than 80% of their total length of 10,000 km. Over 11 years of occupation, the Russians have not invested in the system upgrade, as a result of which only 2.5% of the necessary networks have been replaced so far.

Apart from Donetsk, water supply problems also worsened in Mariupol. Since February, water [has been supplied](#) on schedule only, for three hours in the morning and another three hours in the evening. Despite plans to transfer water from Pavlopil reservoir, its reserves are not enough to provide the city with a stable supply. Overall, it is impossible to ensure a stable water supply in the occupied areas without Siverskyi Donets–Donbas canal which ceased operating back in 2018. Even in the event of full occupation of the oblast, it would be extremely difficult and expensive for Russia to rapidly restore the canal.

In Rubizhne, Luhansk Oblast, the provision of health care services [remained](#) at a low level due to a shortage of specialists. The locals said they had trouble calling an ambulance. They had to go almost 60 km to Starobilsk seeking hospitalisation and were admitted to a hospital only if there were free beds.

2.1. Filtration measures of occupying authorities

Russia [passed](#) a law that allows police to enter the homes of Ukrainians in the TOAs. From 5 March 2025 onwards, under the guise of state's control of migrants, the Russian police were granted the right to enter the homes of those who live without Russian citizenship, i.e. Ukrainians who have not exchanged their Ukrainian passports for Russian ones. Back in 2024, the National Resistance Center warned that starting 2025, Ukrainians living in the occupied areas without Russian passports would be labelled as 'migrants', thus creating grounds for their discrimination and persecution.

Within the first quarter of 2025, the Crimean Tatar Resource Center [recorded](#) at least 15 cases of forced abductions in the Russia-occupied areas of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia oblasts.

On 13 March, [Rustem Viratti](#), a Crimean Tatar, resident of Kherson oblast, reportedly died in a Russian detention centre. He was accused of participating in the Noman Çelebicihan Crimean Tatar volunteer battalion and facilitating the economic blockade of Crimea in 2015. After his arrest, Rustem Viratti was tortured and beaten, while his trials were closed to the public. Sentenced to 8 years in prison, Mr Viratti never left a correctional facility in Dimitrovgrad, Russia's Ulyanovsk region, to which he had been transferred.

Since the outbreak of the full-scale invasion, at least 36 Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians [have been detained](#) in temporarily occupied Kherson oblast on accusations of participating in the Noman Çelebicihan Crimean Tatar volunteer battalion.

At border crossing points in temporarily occupied Melitopol raion, Zaporizhzhia oblast, the Russian military started demanding that civilians pay fines for Ukrainian-language literature allegedly found during car searches, the Yellow Ribbon resistance movement [reported](#). The seized books had school and university library stamps indicating that they belonged to Ukrainian educational institutions. This could mean that the Russian military has somehow earlier got some of those books and now uses them for extorting bribes.

People can [visit](#) Russia-occupied Lysychansk, Luhansk oblast, only on the day specified in a permit, because the city is closed to entry and exit by the occupying authorities. Those willing to visit Lysychansk and not having local registration are required to apply for a permit indicating personal data, good reasons for visiting the city, and the date of visit. If the application is approved, visitors are allowed to stay in the city only during the day specified in the permit. The permit is not valid on other days.

2.2. Actions of occupying authorities regarding recruitment into armed formations

The occupying authorities [were going](#) to intensify forced mobilisation in the Ukrainian TOAs in the spring to compensate for Russia's losses at the front lines. According to the National Resistance Center, draft-age men were forced to sign contracts under threat of arrest, confiscation of property, or deportation. Migrants from Central Asia who came to the TOAs in search of income have become a special target group – they are forced into signing contracts with the Russian Armed Forces. These violate Articles 49 and 51 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War which prohibit the occupying power from compelling civilian persons from serving in its armed forces.

The occupying authorities of the temporarily occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia oblast [increased](#) funding for the military registration system. According to Berdiansk CMA, the legislative assembly of the Kremlin-controlled authorities approved in the first reading a draft law on additional funding for the military registration system. Changes included the simplification and acceleration of military registration, in particular for those who have already completed military service. Such steps indicate that the occupying authorities intend to intensify the process of mobilising the local population into the Russian army.

3. Work on identity

The occupiers [launched](#) Zemsky Cultural Worker programme for bringing 1,100 Russians from the most remote regions of the RF to the TOAs to work in cultural centres and libraries. Would-be cultural workers are paid RUB 2 million, or a little over EUR 17,000, in a lump sum for their consent to relocate. They will have to work in small cities with a population of up to 50,000 people and villages. The [programme](#) will operate in 2025–2027 to replace local staff and strengthen cultural and information control of the occupied areas.

In the TOAs of Zaporizhzhia oblast, the Russian occupiers [registered](#) the first so-called Cossack Society, a propaganda centre financed from the Russian state budget. According to the National Resistance Center, Khutor Cossack Society of Priazovske was established under the leadership of a former convict Viktor Pliashka. Such structures are small in number and have nothing in common with the Ukrainian Cossack tradition.

A project for students, school children, and officials, Media School of Novorossiia, was launched in [Henichesk](#), Kherson oblast. Its goal is propaganda and integration of youths into the Russian information space. The project was established by Science and Culture of the Future and Russia-occupied Kherson Technical University with the assistance of a collaboratorist who heads the Permanent Mission of Kherson Oblast to the Russian government, Volodymyr Bodelan.

3.1. Changes in education standards

A [gradual return](#) to full-time education in the TOAs was reported. In March, 19 schools and 16 kindergartens resumed offline education in Donetsk, Makiivka, Volnovakha, and Yasynuvata. Overall, 474 out of 587 schools, 428 out of 565 kindergartens, and 65 out of 84 colleges in the non-government controlled parts of Donetsk oblast returned to full-time education at the time of writing of the report.

The occupying authorities used education institutions to promote propaganda ideas. [Eaglet Preschoolers](#) project was launched in Luhansk oblast to facilitate ideologically correct upbringing among preschoolers in line with Russian standards. In Kherson oblast, a distorted version of history was extensively [spread](#) glorifying participants in the war against Ukraine as heroes of the so-called special military operation. In occupied Berdiansk, Zaporizhzhia oblast, 18 students of the cadet class of the secondary school No. 10 [swore allegiance](#) to Russia under the church's 'blessing'. The occupiers continued to impose militaristic 'patriotic education', thereby turning education institutions into paramilitary centres.



The actual destruction of the independent system of higher education continued in the occupied areas. Higher education institutions are being closed due to their merger with those in Russia. Specifically, a decision was made to merge [Pryazovskyi State Technical University](#) with Moscow State University of Civil Engineering. Founded in 1930, Pryazovskyi University has specialised in training specialists in metals production and mechanical engineering, key sectors of Mariupol's economy. During the occupation of the city in 2022, the university building suffered significant damage, and the educational institution was relocated to Dnipro, where it resumed operation. Along with that, the occupying administration created a 'clone' of the university in Mariupol which has been made part of the above education institution in the imperial capital. This step signals not only the destruction of 'Mariupol school' of technical education but also a possible change in the priorities of the occupying authorities –decreasing attention to the development of metals production and mechanical engineering in Pryazovia and Donetsk oblast in general.

3.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum work, holidays and their celebration

A propaganda campaign [was launched](#) in Kherson oblast for recognising the genocide of the peoples of the Soviet Union. Kherson 'Oblast Court' examined the application of the local 'Prosecutor's Office' on the recognition of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by German troops during World War II in the territory of the oblast as genocide of the Soviet people. The Russia-installed Prosecutor's Office filed the application for the purpose of "protecting the national interests of the RF", making the world community aware of the victims of Nazism, and restoring historical justice. 17 volumes of evidence of war crimes committed by the German army against civilians of Kherson oblast were submitted to the Court.

In February, a news spread across the occupied areas of Donetsk oblast that sparked outrage among the local population. The occupying authorities [proposed](#) a new anthem for the city of Donetsk, the words of which were criticised for their poor artistic merits and obscenities. That [outraged](#) even pro-Russian activists and cultural figures saying the anthem humiliates the city and its introduction is currently inappropriate. It has to be mentioned that until that moment, Donetsk did not have an official anthem, and a popular lyrical song of 1939 about the Soviet industrialisation (The Dark Mounds Are Sleeping) was played at various official events.

The occupying authorities of the TOAs of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts launched preparations for the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the so-called great victory. To this end, a special committee was established in Zaporizhzhia oblast to organise relevant activities. In 2024, an identical initiative was carried out as a 'victory parade' in Melitopol with the use of Soviet-era symbols.

In [Skadovsk](#), the left-bank part of Kherson oblast, the occupying authorities initiated the creation of a propaganda mural with the involvement of local school students. The mural's key element will be the motto "We'll finish what our grandfathers started" which could be interpreted as a justification for Russia's military aggression.

II. FRONTLINE AND DEOCCUPIED AREAS

The political landscape of the frontline areas was primarily characterised by security challenges. Ongoing shelling, coupled with a massive use of drones and guided aerial bombs, destruction of infrastructure and life support systems, directly affected political processes and administrative decisions. Local authorities continued to prioritise urgent rehabilitation of critical infrastructure, housing repairs, operation of health care facilities, transport, shelters, as well as implementation of mobilisation tasks.

1. Changes in the system of governance

1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

>> EVACUATION

In Donetsk oblast, the evacuation of the civilian population continued but at a slow pace due to a relative stabilisation of the front line. The main surge of evacuees came from Pokrovsk, Kostiantynivka, Myrnohrad, and Rodynske. About 1,000 people remained in [Rodynske](#), just 11 km away from the front line, despite a lack of electricity, water, and heating. Some evacuees did not leave the oblast, placing an additional burden on infrastructure.

2,173 people, including 267 children, have been evacuated from [Kharkiv](#) oblast since the beginning of 2025. The evacuees were placed in 74 accommodation centres where 7,827 people, including 1,051 children, lived at the time of writing of the report. People were evacuated from 352 population centres that were under constant shelling.

Kharkiv OMA [continued to involve](#) international partners to facilitate evacuations of civilians. In late February, a memorandum was signed with Team4UA CF on assisting evacuations from frontline communities and providing emergency aid to evacuees.

There [were](#) 610 families in frontline communities of Zaporizhzhia oblast as of 4 March. Although they were offered evacuation, most refused.

>> DEMINING

According to an updated joint Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA4) released by the World Bank Group, the government of Ukraine, the European Commission, and the United Nations, Ukraine's total costs for clearance of war-affected areas [are estimated](#) at USD 29.8 billion. The estimate is USD 4.8 billion less than the estimate in RDNA3 thanks to progress in survey and clearance operations in the areas of active hostilities. The extensive use of advanced technologies, including aerial surveys, remote sensing, and machine learning, have the potential to expedite surveys and reduce overall costs.

>> REHABILITATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITIES AND THE HOUSING STOCK

In 2025, 160 residential buildings [are to be reconstructed](#) in Kharkiv in 2025. According to Kharkiv Mayor, Ihor Terekhov, the implementation of the plans depends on the amount of funding from the city and state budgets and on the support of international partners. Housing, infrastructure facilities, health care and education institutions remained priority areas. Being cautious about investing in housing reconstruction because of high risks and significant costs, international donors expect the end of the 'hot phase' of the war.

As of early 2025, power supply [was resumed](#) in 116 out of 151 population centres (about 76%) of Beryslav raion, Kherson oblast. 24 communities had no power supply due to ongoing shelling. Overall, 40 coastal population centres of Kherson oblast, including Ostriv microdistrict of Kherson city, remained without electricity and gas.

>> INCREASE IN THE LEVEL OF SAFETY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

Zaporizhzhia authorities [started building](#) 17 modular reinforced concrete shelters near public transport stops. According to Zaporizhzhia City Council, the shelters are designed to protect the population against ammunition fragments and a shock wave with a pressure of up to 500 kPa, in particular in the event of guided bomb strike. The shelters consist of several connected concrete blocks and are equipped with ventilation, seats, and lighting and can accommodate 22 to 50 people depending on location. They are placed primarily in Shevchenkivskyi and Komunarskyi districts of the city which are most vulnerable to shelling. Zaporizhzhia authorities plan to expand the programme to other districts of the city.

>> INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The Kingdom of Denmark [sent](#) a new aid package for Mykolaiv oblast estimated at a total of over UAH 1 billion, or approximately EUR 26 million. The funding will be channelled to several key areas, notably the reconstruction and renovation of education infrastructure, the upgrade of power grids of utility companies, the modernisation of urban transport through the purchase of trolleybuses, and the implementation of water supply projects. EUR 4.5 million of the package would be spent for humanitarian demining.

Kharkiv oblast expanded cooperation with international partners. Cooperation with the [Czech Republic](#) included areas such as the agro-industrial sector and the processing sector oriented towards export to the EU. Furthermore, the Czech Republic assisted in the modernisation of two health care facilities. Specifically, it provided 9 cogeneration units making it possible to enhance the energy autonomy of Chuhuiv, Kharkiv, and Lozova. The total cost of the equipment received exceeded UAH 24 million.

The French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) has already [provided aid](#) for rehabilitating critical infrastructure facilities of Kharkiv through helping provide heat and water supply. The following further steps were agreed upon at a meeting of Kharkiv Mayor and AFD General Director, Remy Riou: raising funds for housing reconstruction, developing social housing, and launching a special programme to support the private sector. An AFD delegation was expected to visit the city in the near term. In its turn, the Finnish government [announced](#) a new aid package for energy decentralisation in the oblast.

>> INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION

In March, Donetsk oblast extensively implemented a nation-wide initiative, [Shoulder to Shoulder: Cohesive Communities](#), uniting partner frontline and rear communities to rehabilitate infrastructure, improve the health of children, and provide humanitarian aid. However, the implementation of its activities was limited to signing memorandums, while the only active partnership, between Kramatorsk and Perechyn communities, concerned business interests. Following a transfer of assets of a politically influential businessman, Kramatorsk [started financing](#) education projects in Perechyn, which caused outrage among Kramatorsk locals left without such support. The financial initiative was implemented without public discussion, which further exacerbated tensions.

The second phase of the project [was launched](#) in Kharkiv oblast to provide support for 16 communities from the northern and eastern parts of the oblast. Cooperation between Kharkiv and Lviv on issues of veteran policy, inclusion, and youth initiatives also intensified.

In Zaporizhzhia oblast, the project [was joined](#) by Shyroky community, a partner of Hoshcha community, Rivne oblast, and Huliaipole community, a partner of Horishni Plavni community, Poltava oblast. The rehabilitation of critical infrastructure facilities [was under way](#) in Kherson oblast – communities of Rivne and Khmelnytskyi oblasts helped arrange shelters in local schools.

Since July 2023, some 1,000 houses have been reconstructed in Kherson oblast as part of Shoulder to Shoulder initiative, the implementation of which was suspended due to a lack of funding. Currently, the project activities are under way.

>> DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY AND RISK MANAGEMENT

The updated Development Strategy for Mykolaiv Oblast until 2027 [incorporates](#) four goals: strengthening resilience, cohesion, and security; ensuring sustainable economic growth; improving the quality of life and effective governance; developing an innovative economy. The Strategy is based on the proposals of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion collected at public consultations in January.

On 20 February, a [public discussion](#) on “Resilience and Cohesion of Mykolaiv Oblast: Risk Assessment” was held in Mykolaiv. 48 representatives of authorities and the public took part in the event organised by the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion. They discussed risks affecting the resilience of the oblast and the need to consider them in policy papers for an effective response.

>> ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTERS

An investigation into three cases of ecocide committed by the Russian militaries [was ongoing](#) in Kharkiv oblast. One case concerns the shelling of Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology where the Neutron Source nuclear facility is located. From March through September 2022, the Institute was shelled 74 times with various types of weapons, which could have led to a serious environmental disaster. The indictment against three Russian generals and two colonels was sent to court for review on the merits. The other two cases involve the shelling of Oskil hydropower facility and an ammonia pipeline in Kupiansk raion resulting in an ammonia leak. Those actions were classified under Articles 441 (Ecocide) and 438 (Violation of Rules of Warfare) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine.

On the night of 27–28 December 2024, debris from a downed Russian drone [struck](#) an industrial vegetable oil tank in Mykolaiv, spilling tons of sunflower oil into the Southern Bug River. More than 9,000 sq. m of the water body and 7,000 sq. m of soil, including water area of the bays of the Bug estuary, were contaminated. According to initial reports by the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, the amount of environmental damage is estimated at around UAH 45 billion UAH, or approximately EUR 960 million.

>> CHALLENGES

In the first quarter of 2025, specialists of the Southern Office of the State Audit Service of Ukraine in Kherson oblast [carried out](#) 64 audits of the use of financial and material resources worth a total of UAH 7 billion. As a result, violations were found which led to a loss of more than UAH 28 million, or approximately EUR 597,000. The measures taken made it possible to return UAH 20.2 million, or approximately EUR 430,000. The auditors also prevented violations of public procurement procedures worth UAH 49 million, or approximately more than EUR 1 million. Four pre-trial investigations were initiated based on the audit results. Two individuals were served notices of suspicion of committing a criminal offense, and seven officials were brought to disciplinary and material liability.

>> FREEZE ON THE U.S. FOREIGN AID

In the event of a prolonged suspension of international financial assistance from the USAID, Donetsk oblast may lose a significant part of its critical infrastructure support, including generators, [water treatment systems](#), and municipal vehicles, which could significantly reduce the resilience of the oblast. At the same time, the current situation does not pose any direct threat to the humanitarian support of the population.

In 2024, Kherson oblast received some UAH 1.5 billion in international aid, most of which was from the USAID. Although in 2025, the oblast [will receive](#) UAH 110 million less due to the suspension of funding from the US, which will particularly impact the agricultural sector. Local authorities recognise that without financial support for irrigation, crop storage, procurements and repairs of health care equipment and municipal vehicles the oblast will face serious economic and social challenges.

2. Work on identity

2.1. Changes in education standards

Full-time education has not been available in Donetsk oblast since the spring of 2020, which leads not only to large education losses, but also to a decrease in communication skills among children who don't have live communication with teachers and classmates. For the time being, only a few schools relocated to other oblasts continue to provide full-time instruction. This also results in a permanent decrease in the number of school children transferring to education facilities in safer areas.

Education facilities of Kharkiv suffered extensive destruction – more than half of the city's schools were damaged or destroyed by shelling, which requires urgent solutions for their rehabilitation.

All schools in Zaporizhzhia oblast will join a nation-wide educational app, [Mriia](#), facilitating teaching and learning. Zaporizhzhia oblast became the first to join the app aimed to provide everyone with equal access to education regardless of their situation.

Presented in 2023, Mriia educational app allows teachers to keep a class register, plan a schedule, give homework, use a content library, and organise communication via chats. Currently, 150 schools are connected to Mriia ecosystem, while another 1,000 have applied for connection.

Only 21 out of 52 territorial communities of Mykolaiv oblast have [well-staffed](#) teaching facilities. The largest deficit of teachers is reported in rural areas where, due to a shortage of specialists, they have to teach several subjects, sometimes more than three. There is also a trend towards the aging of teachers.

2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum work, holidays and their celebration

A working group was established under Kherson OMA to develop a tour route around memorial sites. The group is tasked to collect and systematise information about potential places of memory in communities, including memorials, memorial signs, volunteer centres, and battle sites. The working group is led by the Deputy Head of Kherson OMA and includes representatives of departments of Kherson OMA, museums, and civil society organisations.

3. Joint action

3.1. Cooperation at the community–authorities level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

>> NEEDS OF WAR VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES

The Ministry of Veterans Affairs of Ukraine [announced](#) vacancies for specialists for the support of war veterans and demobilised persons. Applications are to be submitted via eVeteran platform only. Candidates with higher education in some specialties, including social sciences, health care, law, IT, and security, are invited to participate. Preference is given to applicants with veteran status, family members of the deceased militaries, and specialists with experience in providing social services. The initiative is targeted at strengthening aid for war veterans through professional support for their adaptation to peaceful life.



Kharkiv OMA was the first in Ukraine to [launch](#) a service for supporting war veterans in health care facilities. The pilot project has already helped more than 1,500 veterans get treatment, rehabilitation, psychological support, and dental prosthetics services. A total of 75 specialists for the support of war veterans work in 37 hospitals of the oblast.

In February, Mykolaiv Oblast Council [approved](#) a Comprehensive Programme of Social Support for War Veterans and Their Family Members for 2025–2027. The document is aimed at recuperating war veterans and providing them with comprehensive support in the areas of mental health, rehabilitation, employment, and training. The Programme covers the establishment of veteran hubs, provision of financial aid, and creation of a Council of Veterans under Mykolaiv Oblast Council to monitor the Programme implementation. According to the OMA, money will come from the state, oblast, and local budgets, but the specific amount of funding for this year was not disclosed.

>> **SUPPORT FOR THE BUSINESS SECTOR**

On 14 March, Kharkiv OMA discussed a support for agricultural exporters as part of the online platform, [Dialogue between the Government and Business Community](#). There are about 250 stations in the oblast where farmers can apply for a transportation discount. Last year, farmers of Kharkiv oblast received a 30% discount on rail transportation of grain, oilseeds, oilseed meal, and other products. As of now, according to Ukrzaliznytsia, more than 1.6 million tons of agricultural products have already been transported from the frontline areas, notably from Kharkiv oblast.

4. Changes in the social structure

4.1. Challenges related to the situation of women and children, people with disabilities

Kharkiv OMA [continued](#) free distribution of bottled gas to residents of frontline and deoccupied population centres. Currently, 341 households in Izium raion have been provided with bottled gas. Humanitarian aid is primarily distributed to socially vulnerable groups of population, including large families, families with disabled children, low-income families, war veterans and their families, people with disabilities, the elderly, and others.

4.2. Needs of displaced persons. Response

Siverskodonetsk CMA [proposed to involve](#) representatives of the IDP Council in the provision of housing to displaced persons from among community members, and to create a community history hub. Those issues were discussed during an online meeting of the CMA Head, Oleksii Kharchenko, and the IDP Council's Head, Olena Nizhelska. Representatives of the Council are expected to participate in all stages of work as observers.

In partnership with local self-government bodies, volunteers, and international partners, Kharkiv OMA [launched](#) five hubs to support evacuated residents of Vovchansk, Kupiansk, Lyptsi, Kurylivka, and Kindrashivka communities. The hubs provide aid to evacuees through a wide range of services, including humanitarian assistance, administrative services, social protection, and psychological support.

4.3. Needs of volunteers of Territorial Defence Forces. Response. Mobilisation. Exemption from military service

The granting of critical status to businesses enabling them to claim employee exemptions to the draft was ongoing in Donetsk oblast. In March, at least 15 businesses of the oblast were granted critical status, including two for the first time. The approval of oblast criteria simplified and streamlined the process of determining critical businesses, which helped alleviate the burden on the municipal and business sectors from TRSSCs and had positive implications for the labour market. The oblast authorities do not publish the full list of critical businesses and their employees exempt from military duty.

On 27 February 2024, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine terminated the operation of [Shliakh system](#) for drivers transporting medical and humanitarian cargo. From now onwards, their travels abroad will take place on general grounds. According to law enforcement agencies, Shliakh system was used in many cases as a tool to avoid mobilisation. At the same time, representatives of civil society and volunteer organisations raised concerns over the decision, since, in their opinion, the system facilitated prompt import of humanitarian aid, in particular to the frontline areas, and development of international cooperation in the humanitarian sector.

III. RELATIVELY REAR AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

Within the monitoring period, local authorities of the relatively rear areas focused on supporting the viability of communities, providing logistical and financial assistance to the AFU, and ensuring uninterrupted power supply.

1. Changes in the system of governance

On 8 January 2025, the Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Local Self-Governance in Ukraine” and Other Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Democracy at the Level of Local Self-Government” [came into force](#).

The Law obliges territorial communities to have their charters approved by 1 January 2027 and details the procedures for holding general meetings, public hearings, public consultations, local initiatives, and other participatory tools. The Law also sets reporting requirements for community leaders and members of local councils. Significant attention has been paid to ensuring equal access to participatory democracy tools for IDPs, while opportunities for involving youth aged 14 and older in local processes have been expanded.

One of the priority areas of work of the communities of Chernivtsi oblast was the [update of their charters](#). The relevant processes were launched in Nedoboivtsi, Ust-Putyla, Hlyboka, Velykyi Kuchuriv, and Vyzhnytsia communities. As of now, working groups have been created in communities tasked to develop charters within the next six months.

1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

>> INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

On 19 February, the Honorary Consulate of the Czech Republic [was opened](#) in Ivano-Frankivsk. Its activities extend to Ivano-Frankivsk and Chernivtsi oblasts and are focused on supporting joint economic, educational, and cultural initiatives of Ukraine and the Czech Republic.

At a meeting in Odesa on 27 January, the Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine, Oleksii Kuleba, and the Minister of Infrastructure of Estonia, Vladimir Svet, [signed](#) a memorandum of understanding on the implementation of the Plan for the Restoration of the Maritime Industry of Ukraine. The document defines the main areas of modernisation of the sector, including both civilian and military parts, with a special emphasis on the protection of critical infrastructure in wartime. As part of the accords, Estonia is to channel a EUR 600 million aid package to the Ukrainian Navy, which will help enhance security and resilience of maritime infrastructure.

Poland [is considering](#) purchasing or long-term leasing a port in Ukraine’s Odesa to secure access to the Black Sea. The Deputy Minister of Agriculture of Poland, Michał Kołodziejczak, said this would allow Poland and other European countries to freely export grain, notably to Africa, lower the transportation costs of agricultural products, and expand sales markets. Additionally, Poland also wants to lease up to 500,000 ha of agricultural land in Ukraine. The statement was made amid negotiations between Poland and Ukraine on

resolving trade disputes in the agro-industrial complex, including more structured cooperation for the benefit of Polish and Ukrainian producers.

>> INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION

Communities stepped up interregional cooperation with the frontline areas providing for social, humanitarian, educational, cultural and infrastructure support as part of a nation-wide initiative, [Shoulder to Shoulder: Cohesive Communities](#).

Chernivtsi and Sumy [signed](#) a memorandum of cooperation between City Councils. It is expected to share experience, jointly implement social and economic projects, and facilitate support for IDPs.

Emergency medical dispatch services of Bukovyna and Ivano-Frankivsk oblast [planned](#) to act in concert in case of emergencies or communication disruptions. In October 2024, Chernivtsi oblast signed a similar memorandum with Ternopil Oblast Emergency Medical Centre.

>> OPERATION OF PORTS

[According to](#) the Head of Odesa OMA, Oleh Kiper, ports of Odesa oblast handled over 97 million tons of cargo in 2024, 57% up from 2023. The ports of Greater Odesa transported 79.9 million tons of cargo compared to 17.3 million tons handled by the Danube ports exporting primarily agricultural produce to different countries of the world. Since the establishment of the Ukrainian grain corridor, some 3,500 vessels have left the ports of Greater Odesa.

>> JUDGEMENT OF THE ECHR

On 13 March, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) delivered a judgement in the case of [Vyacheslavova and Others v. Ukraine](#) regarding the tragic events in Odesa on 2 May 2014 resulting in 48 dead and 250 injured in clashes between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian protesters. Having recognised that the conflict was largely influenced by Russian propaganda, the ECHR found Ukraine guilty of negligence of its law enforcement authorities that failed to respond effectively to violence. The applicants emphasised the failure of the state to do everything that could be reasonably expected of it to prevent and stop the violence.

According to the judgement, Ukraine is ordered to pay compensation worth EUR 15,000 to the next of kin of each of those who lost their lives and EUR 12,000 to the three survivors who sustained burn. The highest amount of compensation worth EUR 17,000 was awarded to the daughter of Mykhailo Vyacheslavov burnt to death in the Trade Union Building. Ms Vyacheslavova complained about the authorities' groundless and prolonged delay in handing over her father's body for burial. Russia was not a party to the applications.

It has to be mentioned that many Odesa officials of that time, including Dmytro Fuchedzhi, a former deputy chief of police in charge of public security, fled abroad after those terrible events. In April 2023, a Ukrainian court found him guilty in absentia of colluding with representatives of one of the parties and allowing them to commit a crime and [sentenced](#) him to 15 years in prison. At the moment, the ex-police chief does not live in Ukraine and has been wanted for eleven years. In 2019, Ukraine handed over to Russia two activists of Odesa riots – Serhii Dolzhenkov, a Ukrainian national and city police officer until 2012 (in December), and Yevgeny Mefyodov, a Russian national (in September), in exchange for Ukrainian prisoners of war. The then chief of Odesa police, [Petro Lytsiuk](#), was on trial in Ukraine. In June 2024, Prymorskyi Court of Odesa released him from criminal liability, because the periods of limitation for offences committed had expired. One of the defendants in the case, Volodymyr Bodelan, was the Head of Odesa Emergency Service who had [reportedly](#) been a Russian national since 2010. He was accused of the failure to do everything that could be reasonably expected of him to save people. After the 2 May tragedy, he left Ukraine and held various administrative positions in Russia-occupied Crimea. In February 2024, he was appointed as Head of the Permanent Mission of Kherson Oblast to the Russian government upon the recommendation of the so-called Governor of Kherson oblast, Vladimir Saldo.

2. Work on identity

2.1. Changes in education standards

On 14 March 2025, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine [approved](#) a Resolution No. 318 on compensating the cost of education for children of war veterans who entered private pre-higher or higher education institutions. The compensation amounts will be transferred to the accounts of education institutions, while the already-paid amounts will be returned to students. This initiative is being currently implemented on an experimental basis.

2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum work, holidays and their celebration

Throughout the large-scale invasion, attention of communities to the preservation of historical memory and the memorialisation of the events of the Russian-Ukrainian war has increased. Civic identity is growing, which contributes to shaping a clear civic position among the population regardless of nationality or religious belief. Initiatives geared towards solidarity and national unity are important in this context.

In all communities of Chernivtsi oblast, war heroes are honoured at the local and oblast levels. On 14 March, the Ukrainian Volunteer Day, the commemoration of soldiers who volunteered to defend Ukraine [took place](#). The militaries, the public, police officers, representatives of local self-government bodies and executive authorities participated in the events.

A unified concept of erecting monuments to fallen soldiers [was developed](#) in Drohobych, Lviv oblast. The local authorities voiced a proposal to create a unified approach to erecting monuments to fallen soldiers and improving their burial sites.

The opening in Chernivtsi of an [exhibition](#) dedicated to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, under which Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union invaded the Republic of Poland in 1939, had showed growing attention of residents and guests of the oblast to the currently important historical events and their perception through the prism of the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war. The exhibition was organised by German scientists and museum workers from Düsseldorf and Berlin.

Following Russia's attack on the centre of Odesa on 1 February, unknown individuals hung a poster reading "Cargo 200" on a monument to the Russian poet Alexander Pushkin as part of a protest action against imperial signs in the city. The monument on Prymorskyi Boulevard has been targeted by protests and sprayed with paint more than once. Pursuant to the Order of the Head of Odesa OMA, the monuments to Pushkin on Prymorskyi Boulevard and Italiiska Street are to be demolished. Also, a monument to a famous Soviet actor, poet and performer, Vladimir Vysotsky, located at the entrance to Odesa Film Studio was dismantled. In response, a group of protesters picketed the place [demanding](#) that the monument be returned to its original place.

In early January, a public discussion entitled "The Past as a Challenge, the Past as a Resource" [was held](#) in Odesa. Experts, academicians, and public figures discussed the issues of decolonisation, development of cultural identity, and preservation of the city's multicultural flair. The event became a platform for rethinking Odesa's historical heritage in the context of war and strengthening the demand for the renewal of that symbolic space.

2.3. Freedom of religion

In Chernivtsi oblast, home to more than [300 churches](#) of the UOC MP, the conversion of religious communities to the OCU has intensified since the beginning of 2025. As of mid-March, [according to](#) the Department of Culture of Chernivtsi OMA, 16 communities held meetings and confirmed the decision to convert to the OCU, of which 13 had already registered their updated charters.

The [conversion of three parishes](#) of Chernivtsi, the Holy Spirit Cathedral, the St. Nicholas Church and the Sts. Peter and Paul Church, was the most high-profile event. On 16 February, over 2,000 believers voted to join the OCU. However, at an alternative [meeting](#) on 23 February, over 5,000 parishioners of the St. Nicholas Church spoke out in favour of its further subordination to the UOC MP. UOC MP supporters organised 24-hour prayer vigils and restricted access of OCU representatives to churches.

The religious issue remained a source of social tensions in the oblast exacerbated by information conflicts, such as [public appeals](#) to the US and [disputes](#) surrounding Russian-language literature in churches.

During the funeral of a fallen soldier in Komarivka village, Chernivtsi oblast, a [conflict arose](#) between UOC MP priests and the local community. The ceremony was to be conducted by an OCU priest by agreement with the family, but UOC MP priests came without invitation and provoked a conflict, which sparked outrage among the deceased's brothers. The incident became a yet another manifestation of tension between religious communities in the oblast, especially amid the intensified conversion of parishes from the UOC MP to the OCU.

On 23 March, the second in the oblast [iftar](#), the evening meal eaten by Muslims during the holy month of Ramadan, was held in Odesa. The event brought together representatives of the Crimean Tatar community, local authorities, clergy of various faiths, militaries, volunteers, and activists. During the iftar, participants emphasised the importance of unity, solidarity, and mutual respect between cultures and religions in times of war and expressed gratitude to Ukraine's defenders.

2.4. National minorities

From 1 September 2027, a 12-year school education system will be launched in Ukraine, under which high school (grades 10–12) will operate as separate academic and vocational lyceums. In 12 communities of Chernivtsi oblast, historic home to a large number of people of Romanian ancestry, classes with Romanian language of instruction [are to be opened](#) in 13 academic lyceums. Specifically, it is planned to establish 4 Romanian-language lyceums in Chernivtsi, Hlyboka, Hertsa, and Ostrytsia communities and 9 bilingual (Ukrainian-Romanian) institutions. Currently, some subjects are taught in Romanian in 72 out of 337 general secondary education institutions of the oblast.

On 20 March 2025, some organisations of the Hungarian national minority of Zakarpattia, notably the Society of Hungarian Culture of Zakarpattia and the Democratic Union of Hungarians of Ukraine, [addressed](#) a statement to the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Ruslan Stefanchuk, and the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Education, Science and Innovation, Serhii Babak. They voiced concern over the draft laws focused on shaping a "Ukrainian-language educational environment" in education facilities. These initiatives, according to representatives of the Hungarian community, may restrict the use of minority languages, including Hungarian, even in personal communication among school children. In this regard, they called for removing the said draft laws from the parliamentary agenda.

In March, Zakarpattia OMA [presented](#) a methodological guide, Different Together, to support inclusive education for Roma women and girls. The guide is based on the results of a series of trainings under a project implemented by the Transcarpathian Regional Charitable Foundation "Blago" with the assistance of UN Women Ukraine. It provides recommendations and practical advice for developing effective educational programmes that meet the needs of Roma communities. More than 450 Roma women from different Ukraine's oblast have already received training under the initiative.

The EU-funded cross-border project, INCLUSIV.EDU, is implemented in partnership between Romania, Hungary, and Ukraine. It [provides for](#) organising summer camps for children, holding seminars for teachers, sharing experience between teachers, and developing a curriculum for preschool education of Roma children. The initiative will promote diversity and inclusion in schools of Ukraine's border oblast.

3. Joint action

3.1. Cooperation at the community–authorities level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

>> AID FOR THE AFU / SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARIES AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS

In 2025, Lviv community [will earmark](#) UAH 1 billion, or approximately EUR 21.2 million, to support the AFU, making up 5.6% of its budget. Ivano-Frankivsk will allocate UAH 464 million for this purpose, making up 8.9% of its budget, and Chernivtsi will channel UAH 1.119 billion, or approximately EUR 23.9 million, making up 25% of the city budget.

In 2025, aid for war veterans and their families was increased in Chernivtsi oblast through the development of rehabilitation and reintegration programmes and activities of veteran hubs. [There are](#) 167 access points to administrative services; all 52 ASCs provide services to war veterans on a one-stop basis. The registration of immovable properties, the issuance of passports, and specialised services are in most demand.

The Czech Republic [will finance](#) the renovation of branches of Lviv Regional Hospital of War Veterans as part of a EUR 30 million project, Renovation and modernisation of hospitals in Ukraine, to purchase equipment and train staff. The Czech Republic also [funds](#) the construction of 4.5.0 Recovery center in Uzhhorod. The centre will be the first facility of this kind in Zakarpattia oblast.

The second phase of [Trajectory](#) programme was launched in March. The initiative aims to encourage war veterans and their families into starting their own business. It provides for a two-month online and offline training in Diia.Business centres, notably in Ivano-Frankivsk, and offers an opportunity to receive funding. The programme is worth UAH 20 million, or approximately EUR 426,000. 230 businessmen will be selected for participation.

Chernivtsi City Council [made a decision](#) to provide combatants with annual financial benefit worth UAH 5,000 to partly cover the costs of housing and utility services. In compliance with a formerly applicable regulation, the compensation covered 25% of utility bills. However, according to the Deputy Mayor of Chernivtsi, Yurii Lesiuk, its calculation is currently impossible due to technical difficulties. Therefore, the city authorities decided to monetise this benefit.

>> SUPPORT FOR THE BUSINESS SECTOR

The Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations in Ukraine [supported](#) small-scale winemaking in Odesa and Zakarpattia oblasts through technical assistance and access to funding, which will help resume production after the war and increase the productivity of vineyards.

The economic development of Ivano-Frankivsk oblast was complicated by a deficit of labour and financial resources and, consequently, a decline in industrial output. One of the indicators of negative dynamics was a 21 February 2025 [decision](#) of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to remove from the register four industrial parks, including the First Eco-Industrial Park in the city of Dolyna, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, established in 2013. The decision was made due to two-year absence of elected managing companies, which prompted a decline in economic activity. Although the Park can continue operating, it loses the right to government privileges, which complicates its further development.

The manufacturing sector of Zakarpattia oblast also faced a labour deficit triggered, among other things, by mobilisation of men and evasion of official employment. In response, companies of the oblast considered the possibility of [attracting workforce](#) from abroad, notably from Bangladesh and other Asian countries. The initiative [evoked](#) mixed response from the public and raised questions about the government's migration policy and readiness of local communities to host foreigners. This also refutes a widespread stereotype that Zakarpattia oblast, home to more than 400,000 IDPs, is [overpopulated](#). Yet Zakarpattia has specifics of population settlement dictated by its terrain configuration. Mountains occupy 80% of the oblast's territory.

>> CHALLENGES

On 11 March 2025, a tragedy orchestrated by Russian special services occurred in Ivano-Frankivsk. According to the investigation, the enemy recruited two local teenagers aged 15 and 17. They were supposed to place their homemade explosive devices in the city. However, while transporting one of the devices, Russian special services remotely activated the explosives, resulting in the [death](#) of a 17-year-old teenager and serious injuries of his 15-year-old accomplice. The incident became part of a broader strategy by Russian special services which have been actively recruiting teens for sabotage activities since the onset of the full-scale invasion.

3.2. Cooperation at the level of society. Initiatives. Trust between groups

>> AID FOR THE AFU

The first situational awareness and FPV simulator classes in Ukraine were opened at the Hetman Petro Sahaidachnyi National Ground Forces Academy, thanks to charitable contributions from Ukrainians amounting to over UAH 1.5 million, or approximately EUR 32,100. The training space is designed to train would-be commanders and military officers to improve their skills in operating unmanned aerial vehicles and working with situational awareness software. The initiative is implemented in assistance with [Come Back Alive](#) Foundation.

A mobile dental and surgical office for the militaries established by Viorel Radukan, a resident of Chernivtsi and President-elect of the Association of Implantologists of Ukraine, [has been operating](#) in Ukraine for more than a year. Since January last year, a team of five doctors on a specially equipped bus set off for Kharkiv oblast to provide medical aid to soldiers from Bukovyna. Since then, the team has expanded with specialists from Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, and Sumy. The geography of visits has also expanded – doctors worked in frontline cities, such as Derhachi, Kharkiv oblast, and in rear population centres, such as Hostomel, Rivne, and Sumy. A total of more than a thousand defenders were provided with dental treatment under that initiative.

Individuals, organisations, and institutions were extensively engaged in raising funds and purchasing the necessary equipment and devices for the AFU's needs.

>> CHALLENGES

A freeze on funding for USAID projects posed a challenge for civil society. In early March, coordinators of DOBRE. Voice of Communities [activity](#) in Chernivtsi oblast announced its closure having emphasised that the initiative was targeted at developing communication within the community.

The termination of funding also affected [projects](#) implemented in Odesa, notably VETERANS HUB ODESA, Intent newspaper of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine partly funded by the USAID, and Odesa City Heating municipal enterprise.

A lack of funding from the USAID decreases the capacity of civil society organisations and foundations in various regions of Ukraine. However, they are looking for new sources of support calling on the business sector and local communities to join efforts to preserve pivotal social projects.

4. Changes in the social structure

4.1. Challenges related to the situation of women and children, people with disabilities

Chernivtsi City Council [established](#) the Barrier-Free Council, an advisory body designed to remove barriers for people with disabilities, low-mobility groups, the elderly, and parents with young children. The Council's scope of activities includes improving urban infrastructure and transport, access to information, education, digital services and developing social interaction.

"Pai" sound beacons, an innovative solution to improve the accessibility of institutions for people with vision loss, [were presented](#) at the Warrior's House in Lviv. The device helps blind and visually impaired visitors navigate in space and find the entrance to premises using a special application. The sound beacons were created by Practice of Innovative Experience DPO.

"Live On" project [was launched](#) in Lviv to support women who lost their husbands in the war. The project was initiated by Oksana Hankevich, a wife of a deceased military medic of the 125th Territorial Defence Brigade. The initiative aims to help participants find a new meaning in life and strengthen their economic, social, and emotional resilience.

4.2. Needs of displaced persons. Response

New IDPs continued to come to the relatively rear areas due to ongoing hostilities in the east of Ukraine. In January, 26 people from Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Velyka Novosilka, and Komar communities, Donetsk oblast, [were accommodated](#) in Burshtyn community, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast. In February, two evacuation trains with displaced persons from the frontline areas of Pokrovsk and Kostyantynivka raions arrived in Chernivtsi.

>> HOUSING FOR IDPS

Since 29 January 2025 a pilot project [has been implemented](#) in Ukraine to provide housing rental subsidies for IDPs who fled the TOAs or the areas of hostilities. The two-year project provides for financial support to households that do not have their own homes or have lost their homes due to hostilities, provided that rental costs exceed 20% of their total income and that they do not receive other cost-of-living benefits or compensation under the Prykhystok programme.

The subsidy is calculated depending on household composition, and not only household size, thus covering a wider range of recipients. Both IDPs registered after 24 February 2022 and displaced persons who fled their homes in 2014–2021 can apply for assistance. The housing rental subsidy and the housing and utility allowance can be paid simultaneously.

The construction of social housing for IDPs [was launched](#) in Ivano-Frankivsk under the "Housing for Internally Displaced Persons and Rehabilitation of Liberated Cities of Ukraine. Component II" programme funded by the European Union and managed by the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (NEFCO). The EUR 9.5 million project provides that the buildings will remain in community ownership without the right to privatisation. The new apartments with furniture and household appliances will accommodate some 300 people, although earlier it was planned to provide housing for up to 600 families.

The construction of multi-storey buildings for IDPs [was launched](#) in Chernivtsi under the "EU Support for Urgent Housing Needs for Internally Displaced Persons in Chernivtsi" action funded by the EU and managed by NEFCO. A total project budget is over EUR 10 million. Also, a non-residential building was rearranged for temporary housing for IDPs in Vikno community and additional temporary housing for IDPs was provided in three communities of the oblast, including Novoselytsia, Vyzhnytsia, and Vikno ones.

>> SUPPORT AND ADAPTATION OF IDPS

Yuriy Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University [launched](#) a short-term programme, Integrated Development: From Adaptation to Entrepreneurship, for IDPs living in Chernivtsi and Chernivtsi oblast. The programme will last from 3 March through 15 June 2025. After successfully completing a training course that covers academic disciplines on economic and legal foundations of entrepreneurship, administration, business models, and up-to-date management tools, participants will be awarded a completion certificate from Chernivtsi National University.


4.3. Needs of volunteers of Territorial Defence Forces. Response. Mobilisation

In February, the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine launched a [Contract 18–24](#) project enabling volunteers aged 18 to 24 to sign annual contracts for military service worth up to UAH 1 million, or approximately EUR 21,400. Later, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine [extended](#) the initiative to the military personnel who volunteered for military service under the age of 25 after 24 February 2022. The Cabinet Resolution which sets the conditions for receiving the payment entered into force on 13 February 2025. Also, social benefits are provided for soldiers.

In March, the first volunteers who signed the Contract 18–24 [joined](#) the 10th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade “Edelweiss”. The Mayor of Kolomyia, Ivano-Frankivsk oblast, said recruits who signed contracts with Edelweiss would receive additional UAH 30,000 to purchase ammunition.

A recruiting centre of the Territorial Defence Forces of the AFU [was opened](#) in Lviv where those interested can learn about military service opportunities and choose a military profession. This is the 13th centre of this kind in Lviv opened in partnership with the City Council. The Territorial Defence Forces currently need specialists in various specialties, including signal operators, drivers, medics, UAV operators, scouts, etc. Such recruiting centres of the AFU also operate in other cities, e.g. in Ivano-Frankivsk, through which over 500 people [have applied](#) in six months, including 205 planning to serve on a contractual basis.

The number of women willing to serve in the army increased in Ukraine. The share of women joining the Defence Forces has reached 21%. The largest number of applications from Ukrainian women, 43%, was recorded in Chernivtsi oblast.



Source: [Ukraine's Defence Ministry](#)

Amid daily reports of losses, mobilisation in Ukraine faces numerous challenges, primarily evasion of military service ranging from attempted [illegal](#) border crossings to fake disability certificates through corrupt practices. Various categories of persons are involved in such schemes, including [doctors](#), [educators](#), [minors](#) and [law enforcement officers](#) educators, minors, and law enforcement officers.

The number of overdue and unpaid fines imposed by TRSSCs for violations of military registration rules is rapidly growing in Ukraine. Since the beginning of 2025, some 10,000 enforcement proceedings have been opened to collect unpaid fines, which is almost equal to the total number of such proceedings in 2023. Ukrainians however are in no hurry to meet their financial obligations – only about 50% of enforcement proceedings opened last year have been closed.


In January 2025, for the first time in Ukraine TRSSCs [imposed fines](#) on several mayors in Lviv oblast for their alleged failure to fulfil mobilisation plans. The Mayor of Drohobych, Taras Kuchma, called such actions unlawful emphasising that local self-government bodies cannot use coercion to bring conscripts to military registration and enlistment offices. At the same time, the West Operational Command considers actions of TRSSCs to be lawful.

The incident triggered protests from the local authorities appealing to the President about pressure on communities. The situation highlighted the inconsistency between the legislative requirements to local authorities and the real possibilities of fulfilling mobilisation tasks at the local level.

DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

Conceptual framework of the approach of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion

RESILIENCE means a social practice at the national, oblast, and local levels that offers opportunities to overcome challenges and adapt to transformations.



We measure resilience in the following three dimensions:

- **adaptive capacity** of social systems and institutions to crises and sudden environmental changes
- **self-recovery** that means mobilisation of citizens, institutions to jointly solve various humanitarian, social, and security tasks,
- **resistance** means stabilisation of models of cooperation between the government, business community, and civil society which contributes to increasing the level of cross-sectoral trust in the course of transformation.

SOCIAL COHESION means the state of relationships in society between social groups (horizontal cohesion) and between society and the authorities (vertical cohesion). It is measured by the levels of trust and norms of reciprocity (development of positive social capital); the strength of civil society; and conflict management institutions being in place (e.g., responsible democracy, independent judiciary, etc.).

RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL COHESION ARE BASED on common approaches, shared values, and versatile models of cooperation.

>> **FOCUS:**

on actors, changes in the governance, assessment of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and transformation as opposed to return to the previous state.

>> **DATA COLLECTION:**

- temporarily occupied and frontline areas – Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv oblasts
Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place – Odesa, Mykolaiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Zakarpattia, and Chernivtsi oblasts.

DATA SOURCES: publications in the media, decisions of authorities, draft decisions of authorities, data of surveys and public opinion polls, data of social networking sites, reports of non-governmental organisations, and any other publicised information. The data are collected by coordinators of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion in 11 oblasts, based on data sources, their own understanding of the state of affairs and involvement in local cohesion processes.

>> PROBLEMS

In the temporarily occupied areas:

- **Dynamics of occupation.** The advance of Russian troops, the situation in occupied population centres; opinions of the population of the oblast / community / political forces regarding Russia's occupation and military actions.
- **Changes in the system of governance.** Decisions and information of the occupying authorities; cases of collaborationism; seizure of property; expropriation of products by the occupying administrations.
- **Humanitarian situation.** Filtration measures of the occupying authorities; forced deportation and its routes; hostage taking; recruitment into armed formations; nature of evacuation; destruction; access to health care services.
- **Work on identity.** The operation of educational facilities; relocation of school children, students, and teachers; forced Russification; Russian state education standards; politics of memory: place names, museum work, holidays and their celebration; activities of religious organisations.
- **Changes in the social structure.** Challenges related to the situation of women, children, and people with disabilities.

In the Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place:

- **Dynamics of military operations.** Shelling and attacks / weapons used against the civilian population; destruction.
- **Changes in the system of governance.** The organisation of activities of authorities and access of citizens to decision-making at the local level; access to public information; coordination of actions of volunteers and authorities, as well as actions between authorities at a variety of levels, authorities and the militaries, volunteers and the militaries, etc.
- **Humanitarian situation.** The accessibility of drinking water, food, communication, electricity; access to health care services; provision with humanitarian aid at the oblast level.
- **Changes in the social environment.** The attitudes in communities to changes in symbols, calendars (holidays, memorial days); renaming of streets and other public places; operation of educational facilities, relocation of school children, students, and teachers; civil society and business community, labour market.
- **The situation of internally displaced persons.** The availability of housing and employment; integration into the host community; networking.

>> THE PUBLISHING FREQUENCY OF THE REPORT

The initial monitoring report covers the first four months of the large-scale invasion (from February through June), starting on 24 February 2022; the monitoring reports Nos. 2–9 have a two-month timeframe, and those including and following the monitoring report No. 10 have a three-month timeframe.



ABOUT UKRAINIAN CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL RESEARCH

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RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

Periodic report based on monitoring materials from selected regions of Ukraine
Issue No. 14. January – March 2025

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