


RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

Periodic report based on monitoring materials
from selected regions of Ukraine



2026



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This report was drafted by the team of the Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) as part of the activities of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion (National Platform). This civic initiative was launched in February 2018 (formerly known as the National Platform 'Dialogue on Peace and Secure Reintegration').

The National Platform's activities are geared towards strengthening the national resilience of Ukraine. This could be done through establishing dialogue practices in society, providing the authorities with proposals for developing relevant policies, particularly those on resilience and social cohesion as well as ensuring public awareness of these processes. The initiative has been implemented with the financial support of the European Union as part of the 'Sustaining Ukrainian Resilience and European Security through Dialogue' project.

The report is based on data on events in 12 oblasts of Ukraine that are relevant to shaping a policy of national resilience. The project target oblasts were selected based on analysis of changes in the cohesion of local populations due to the outbreak of military operations and include Vinnytsia, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpattia, Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Kherson, Chernivtsi, and Chernihiv oblasts. For data collection, we distinguish between the temporarily occupied areas, frontline and deoccupied areas, and relatively rear areas.

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The text of the report is available for download on the websites of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion <http://national-platform.org> and UCIPR www.ucipr.org.ua.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AFU	Armed Forces of Ukraine
ASC	Administrative Services Centre
CMA	City Military Administration
DIU	Defence Intelligence of Ukraine
DPR	Donetsk People's Republic
EW	Electronic Warfare
GAB	Guided Aerial Bomb
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IO	Influence Operation
LPR	Luhansk People's Republic
NABU	National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine
NPP	Nuclear Power Plant
OCU	Orthodox Church of Ukraine
OMA	Oblast Military Administration
RF	Russian Federation
ROC	Russian Orthodox Church
SAPO	Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office
SESU	State Emergency Service of Ukraine
SMO	Special Military Operation
TOA	Temporarily Occupied Area
TPP	Thermal Power Plant
TRSSC	Territorial Recruitment and Social Support Centre
UGCC	Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UOC (MP)	Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate

SUMMARY

The situation at the front line

In July–August, the pace of the Russian advance in Donetsk oblast slowed, while Russian pressure increasingly centred on the Sloviansk–Kramatorsk–Druzhkivka–Kostiantynivka urban agglomeration. In some areas, Russian forces crossed the Siverskyi Donets–Donbas Canal. They were 7–9 kilometres from residential areas of Kramatorsk. No significant changes to the front line were recorded along the Lyman axis.

The slower ground advance was accompanied by intensified strikes on cities in Donetsk oblast. Russian forces used guided aerial bombs more frequently against Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, including in large-scale attacks. Residential buildings, health care facilities, post offices, shops, and shopping centres were among the sites hit.

In Kharkiv oblast, active hostilities continued along the Southern Slobozhanskyi and Kupiansk axes. In August, Ukrainian forces liberated territory near Dvorichna and took control of the northern part of the village of Zapadne. Russian strikes also extended to communities previously considered relatively safer, while FPV drones were used with growing frequency against targets in Kharkiv itself.

Along the Zaporizhzhia axis, Russian forces intensified assault operations in the Huliaipole and Orikhiv sectors, but no large-scale breakthrough occurred. Ukrainian forces contained the offensive and carried out counterattacks, preventing Russian forces from building on local tactical gains. Zaporizhzhia and frontline communities across the oblast were regularly attacked with guided aerial bombs and drones.

In the right-bank part of Kherson oblast, Russian ground activity was limited, but attacks from a distance became even more systematic. Drone attacks remained extremely intense, and civilian transport was hit particularly often, including minibuses, taxis, private and evacuation vehicles, and emergency service vehicles. In late August, new air strikes significantly damaged Kherson TPP, complicating the city's preparations for the heating season.

In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, strikes on Nikopol and Synelnykove raions intensified, while Pavlohrad and Kryvyi Rih came under heavy attack. The deteriorating security situation led to wider evacuations. Meanwhile, along the Oleksandrivka axis, Ukrainian forces regained control of some territory.

In Mykolaiv oblast, Russian strikes affected not only coastal communities but also port, transport, industrial, and energy infrastructure elsewhere in the oblast. In Chernihiv oblast, alongside the continued shelling of border areas, Russian forces began using jet-powered drones extensively.

In Odesa oblast, the intensity of Russian strikes remained high. Alongside port infrastructure, residential buildings, businesses, logistics facilities, and energy infrastructure regularly came under attack. In late August, strikes on energy infrastructure caused power outages.

I. TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS

In July–August, the occupying authorities prepared for elections to the State Duma of the RF, tightened digital and administrative control over the population, and continued to redistribute property and resources.

Basic living conditions remained difficult. In some areas, problems with electricity and water supplies, fuel availability, transport, health care and other services continued for extended periods. In Kherson oblast, the occupying authorities were forced to declare a state of emergency throughout the occupied part of the oblast. In Zaporizhzhia oblast, repeated disruptions to Zaporizhzhia NPP's off-site power supply kept nuclear and radiation safety risks high.



Pressure on the population increased. Persecution for passing information to the Ukrainian side, providing financial support to Ukraine, and other acts deemed disloyal created an atmosphere of fear and distrust. The seizure of real estate also continued, while land and other resources were increasingly coming under the control of occupying structures.

The negative demographic trend persisted. The outflow of local residents was accompanied by the influx of Russian citizens and the replacement of local workers across various sectors. This gradually changed the social structure of the occupied areas and created additional challenges for their future recovery.

Ahead of the new school year, the occupying authorities intensified the militarisation of education, expanded military training, and delivered Russian propaganda literature to schools. Through commemorative projects and public events, they also continued to reshape public space and the politics of memory.

In the occupied part of Kherson oblast, the military registration of Ukrainian citizens was increasingly used as a means of control and subsequent recruitment into the Russian military.

II. FRONTLINE AND DE-OCCUPIED AREAS

The security situation in frontline areas continued to deteriorate, with attacks increasingly affecting the day-to-day functioning of communities. In the most dangerous areas, health care, transport, retail, and other services became less accessible. Communities also adapted their urban and transport infrastructure to new threats.

The health care system continued to suffer losses even as it adapted to new conditions. In the communities facing the greatest danger, some hospitals and medical units suspended or scaled back operations, while elsewhere health care infrastructure was restored, mobile services were expanded, and hospitals improved their readiness to operate during attacks.

Evacuation continued, but in July–August the strain on the system for receiving and accommodating evacuees increased markedly. Transit centres received hundreds, and in some cases, thousands of people, while special temporary accommodation centres were set up for certain groups of evacuees. Housing difficulties for IDPs also remained a distinct source of social tension. Rising rents and the limited availability of affordable housing made it harder to secure long-term accommodation and could affect people's willingness to evacuate.

Despite the continuing security risks, residents, volunteer organisations, and civic initiatives remained active. Assistance to people affected by shelling, fundraising campaigns, civil protection training, volunteer teams, and local initiatives remained important resources for communities.

Mobilisation continued to pose a distinct challenge, with reports of conflicts involving notification teams, attacks on TRSSC staff, and complaints about their conduct.

Information risks increased due to the spread of unreliable reports on anonymous local Telegram channels. Such reports drew on issues of immediate concern to residents, including evacuation, security, and financial assistance.

Governance in frontline communities continued to function, and they retained their capacity for self-organisation. However, as the area exposed to security risks expanded, access to basic services became increasingly restricted.

III. RELATIVELY REAR AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

Within the monitoring period, the situation in Vinnytsia, Zakarpattia, Lviv, and Chernivtsi oblasts remained generally stable. The authorities continued efforts to strengthen security, prepare for the autumn–winter period, and support service members, veterans, and IDPs. Odesa oblast faced a different situation: regular strikes on energy, port, and civilian infrastructure affected electricity and water supplies, maritime logistics, and the oblast economy.

Across these oblasts, work continued to prepare critical infrastructure for possible disruptions to energy supplies. Backup and renewable generation capacity was expanded, shelters were inspected, backup water supply systems were prepared, and emergency response exercises were conducted. In some oblasts, these measures were already moving beyond short-term response and becoming part of longer-term adaptation to wartime conditions.

International and cross-border cooperation covered energy, transport, rehabilitation, infrastructure, and investment. Communities, businesses, charities, and civil society organisations continued to support the Ukrainian Defence Forces. In some oblasts, horizontal cooperation among the authorities, civil society, businesses, volunteers, and veterans' organisations remained strong and continued to be an important resource for societal resilience.

Economic activity continued: new businesses opened, production resumed, and grant and loan support programmes remained in place. Labour shortages, particularly a lack of skilled workers, remained a notable constraint on economic development. This problem was compounded by adverse demographic trends: in all relatively rear oblasts, deaths outnumbered births, while in Vinnytsia and Lviv oblasts the number of births fell noticeably compared with the previous year.

In the social sphere, veteran support and rehabilitation programmes continued to expand. For IDPs, housing remained the main unresolved problem, with existing programmes reaching only some displaced people.

On identity-related issues, changes to the education network continued, alongside the memorialisation of fallen and missing service members and the renaming of sites associated with the Soviet and imperial legacy. In Zakarpattia, Hungarian-language education remained a sensitive issue. The Ukrainian and Hungarian ombudspersons also agreed to conduct reciprocal monitoring visits to assess respect for the rights of national minorities.

In Zakarpattia, some public discussions contrasted local residents with newcomers, creating risks to social cohesion.

Tensions surrounding mobilisation remained high. Reports of possible violations of citizens' rights and abuses within the TRSSC system were accompanied by cases of aggression against service members, problems with reserving employees from mobilisation, and attempts by persons liable for military service to leave the country illegally.

Public trust in the authorities was affected by certain personnel and administrative decisions. The removal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov prompted protests, with demonstrators calling for his reinstatement and greater transparency in personnel decisions. The protests were peaceful, indicating that people remained able to express their civic views publicly. Fedorov left office as part of the government's resignation following the Prime Minister's departure from office.

I. TEMPORARILY OCCUPIED AREAS

(DONETSK, ZAPORIZHZHIA, AND KHERSON OBLASTS)

1. Changes in the system of governance

In the occupied part of Donetsk oblast, several personnel changes were made within the reporting period, continuing the practice of replacing local officials with appointees from other regions of Russia. Specifically, [Dmitry Krasnov](#), a native of Chuvashia who had previously served as Deputy Prime Minister of Chuvashia, was appointed the so-called Minister of Economic Development of the DPR. [Vyacheslav Egoztsev](#), a native of Perm Krai who had previously headed the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs Directorate for Zabaykalsky Krai, was appointed the so-called Head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for the DPR.

1.1. Decisions of occupying authorities

>> PREPARATIONS FOR ELECTIONS TO THE STATE DUMA OF THE RF

Preparations continued in the occupied parts of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts for the so-called elections to the State Duma of the RF, scheduled for 18–20 September. Five single-member constituencies were established in the occupied areas of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts: three in Donetsk oblast and one each in Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts.

Candidate registration was completed in Donetsk oblast. Fifteen candidates were registered across the three constituencies: six in the Makiivka constituency, four in the Donetsk one, and five in the Horlivka one. Overall, representatives of the main Russian parliamentary parties, as well as self-nominated candidates, were permitted to stand in the elections in the occupied areas.

In the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia oblast, preparations included updating voter lists using Russian registers, forming election commissions, campaigning through media controlled by the occupying authorities, and using administrative resources.

In Kherson oblast, the occupying authorities continued to develop electoral infrastructure: they [approved](#) the ballot paper, [allocated](#) airtime and newspaper space among candidates and parties, [began training](#) 'observers' and [recruiting](#) 'volunteers', and [launched](#) the Mobile Voter system. They [planned](#) to print more than 340,000 ballot papers for the vote.

The occupying authorities also planned to hold [early voting](#) during the so-called elections. In Donetsk oblast, early voting [was scheduled to run](#) from 28 August to 17 September, including voting at home and at workplaces. The occupying authorities said the extended voting period was necessary to ensure voter safety and prevent crowding at polling stations. Also, early voting [was scheduled to take place](#) in the temporarily occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts.

This model significantly limited opportunities for voters to cast their ballots freely and in secret. Under occupation, amid repression and the activities of Russian security agencies, voting directly at people's homes created additional opportunities for administrative and psychological coercion. This risk was particularly significant in light of the repressive practices documented in the temporarily occupied areas.

On 13 August, the Central Election Commission of Ukraine [declared](#) the organisation, preparation, and conduct of the so-called elections to the State Duma of the RF in the temporarily occupied areas of Ukraine illegitimate. The CEC noted that Russia was using electoral procedures as a tool to legitimise the occupation and forcibly integrate the seized Ukrainian territories into its political and legal framework. The Commission

also stressed that the results of such elections and any documents issued on their basis were legally null and void.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine [warned](#) CIS observers against monitoring the vote in the temporarily occupied areas, stressing that their presence would not alter the illegal nature of the vote and could be used by Russia to legitimise the occupation.

>> ZAPORIZHZHIA NPP

In July and August 2026, the situation at temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhia NPP remained difficult. In July, the plant experienced two complete losses of off-site power – on 3 and 14 July – and relied on emergency diesel generators. Restoring off-site power remained difficult because of damage to the electricity infrastructure. With IAEA mediation, local ceasefires were arranged to enable repairs near the line of contact.

In August, Zaporizhzhia NPP lost off-site power four times: on 1, 4, 8, and 20 August. [Pavlo Kovtoniuk](#), Head of Energoatom, reported that the regular use of diesel generators was causing wear on the equipment and worsening the situation at the plant.

On 24 July, damage to the electricity network caused by shelling [disrupted](#) the centralised water supply at Zaporizhzhia NPP and in Enerhodar. Water from groundwater wells began to be used to cool the reactors.

On 18 August, a drone [exploded](#) at a bus stop used by Zaporizhzhia NPP personnel. One person was killed and 15 others were injured, three of them seriously. Those affected included plant staff and contractor personnel.

Russia's military presence at the plant remained an additional risk factor. According to the [DIU](#), Russian forces had deployed military equipment in the turbine halls of four reactor units and established drone control posts on the Zaporizhzhia NPP site. The [Centre for Strategic Communications](#) also stated that Russia was using Zaporizhzhia NPP as a military base and an instrument of nuclear blackmail and was denying IAEA experts access to all facilities and locations at the plant.

Despite these incidents, [radiation levels](#) around Zaporizhzhia NPP remained within the normal background range throughout the reporting period.

>> CONTROL OVER LAND AND PROPERTY

In the occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia oblast, Russia [continued to tighten](#) its control over land resources and the agricultural sector. The occupying authorities planned to establish an agro-industrial park and transfer a plot of land in Berdiansk for permanent use by a Russian institution responsible for land reclamation and agricultural water supply. The specific parameters of these projects had not yet been made public. According to experts, these measures were bringing local resources and infrastructure under the control of Russian institutions and gradually integrating them into Russia's administrative and economic system.

>> REPRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST THE POPULATION

Detentions, searches, and criminal prosecutions by Russian security agencies continued in the temporarily occupied areas. Residents faced prosecution for alleged high treason, terrorism, extremism, and assistance to the Ukrainian military. Financial transfers in support of Ukraine, passing information to Ukraine, and online statements could all serve as grounds for prosecution.

On 19 August, the [FSB](#) reported the detention of four women from Kherson oblast for transferring funds to accounts that, according to the Russian authorities, were used to support the AFU. They could face life imprisonment. The occupying prosecutor's office also decided to bring two residents of Oleshky and Skadovsk raions to trial for 'calls for extremist activity' in a messaging app.

The expanding practice of prosecuting people for financial support, online statements, and contacts with the Ukrainian side increased self-censorship and fear, forcing people to limit their public activity and social contacts and thereby contributing to the atomisation of local communities.

>> INFORMATION CONTROLS, SURVEILLANCE, AND PROPAGANDA

The occupying authorities continued to tighten control over the information space and digital communications. In August, the [rules for obtaining](#) SIM cards were updated: foreign nationals were limited

to 10 subscriber numbers, and SIM cards could be purchased only at mobile operators' retail outlets. The restrictions also applied to Ukrainian citizens who did not hold Russian citizenship.

In the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia oblast, the occupying administration continued to expand the Russian satellite television network. The Russkiy Mir operator offered residents free installation and replacement of television equipment, encouraging them to switch to Russian television packages, the Yellow Ribbon movement [reported](#).

Russian media used claims of Kostiantynivka's alleged capture to disseminate unverified stories about the 'rescue' of civilians and '[crimes by Ukrainian forces](#)'. As was customary, the occupying authorities did not rush to identify the individuals behind such unsubstantiated 'testimonies'.

>> DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

Demographic changes continued in the temporarily occupied areas, including due to the outflow of the local population and the arrival of Russian citizens. In the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia oblast, these trends were accompanied by population decline and rising mortality. According to data published in late July, the population of the occupied part of the oblast [fell](#) by more than 27,000 over the course of a year, while mortality increased by almost 35%.

Amid staff shortages, local personnel in occupying administrative bodies, security agencies, educational institutions, and health care facilities continued to be replaced by Russian citizens, including public-sector employees, security personnel, and members of their families.

2. Humanitarian situation

The humanitarian situation in the temporarily occupied areas remained difficult and deteriorated further because of disruptions to critical infrastructure, problems with electricity and water supplies, fuel shortages, and transport disruptions.

In Kherson oblast, the occupying administration was forced to [declare](#) a technological emergency. It was initially declared in some areas on 3 July and extended to the entire occupied left-bank part of the oblast in late July. The stated reasons included energy infrastructure failures that disrupted normal living conditions, as well as fires and the destruction of crops, machinery, and other property.

In August, large-scale power outages affected the entire occupied left-bank part of Kherson oblast. On [5 August](#), all 14 'municipal districts' were left without electricity; on 13 August, there were two power outages in a single day; and on [14 August](#), all districts on the left bank experienced an emergency power outage again. Disruptions to water supplies, mobile communications, internet access, and television were also recorded.

The situation was even more difficult in remote population centres. According to the Russian side, electricity in Kairy, Hornostaivka, and Zavodivka was supplied for only one day every two weeks. In Kairy, interruptions to the electricity supply left the settlement without centralised water supplies for around a month.

Fuel shortages also forced the occupying administration to suspend 27 passenger transport routes. As of 9 August, only 14 [had been restored](#). Transport problems made it more difficult for residents to access social services and payments. Specifically, residents of the Hola Prystan community [were unable to receive](#) pensions in their places of residence for extended periods and had to travel to Zaliznyi Port or leave their bank cards with people they trusted.

In the occupied areas of Donetsk oblast, problems with logistics and basic public utility services worsened. Specifically, the occupying authorities attributed [delays](#) in deliveries from online marketplaces and the closure of some collection points to 'logistical difficulties'. Prolonged power outages also affected water supplies. On 31 July, a large-scale blackout [halted](#) water supplies in several districts of Donetsk and neighbouring cities, while in mid-July water supply disruptions were recorded simultaneously in 12 Russian-occupied cities.

Disruptions to basic public utility services also persisted in the occupied part of Zaporizhzhia oblast. On 23 August, residents of [Tokmak](#) reported prolonged problems with electricity and water supplies. According to residents, there had effectively been no stable electricity supply since April, with power available only

intermittently. Parts of the city also lacked centralised water supplies. A similar situation had reportedly persisted for more than two weeks in Melitopol and Berdiansk.

Problems with access to health care recorded during the previous monitoring period continued. The health care system in occupied Kherson oblast remained dependent on specialists from the RF, with the [shortage of health care personnel](#) exceeding 1,800 and only 47% of physician posts filled.

2.1. Actions of occupying authorities regarding recruitment into armed formations

One form of coercion involved integrating residents of the occupied areas into Russia's military system. According to Ukrainian investigators, the occupying authorities in the occupied left-bank part of Kherson oblast [placed](#) at least 2,700 Ukrainian citizens **on the military register** with the aim of later conscripting them into the Russian armed forces; some had already been conscripted. Investigators said people were forced to undergo conscription procedures through threats of violence, unlawful detention, restrictions on leaving, loss of access to social services, deportation, and, in some cases, torture.

Military registration therefore served not only a mobilisation function. It was also becoming another mechanism for registering, controlling, and coercing the population, deepening residents' dependence on the occupying administration.

3. Work on identity

3.1. Changes in education standards

In the temporarily occupied areas, education remained one of the key instruments of Russification and ideological influence on children. Ahead of the new school year, the occupying authorities continued to align the education process with Russian standards, displacing Ukrainian educational content and reinforcing Russian historical and political narratives. Russian propaganda literature was being supplied to school libraries in the temporarily occupied areas of Zaporizhzhia oblast, the [National Resistance Center](#) reported. From the start of the new school year, the literature was to be used in lessons and extracurricular activities, while reading clubs were being established and themed events organised to promote it. The Center assessed this as part of a policy aimed at imposing Russian historical and political narratives on children and gradually removing Ukrainian literature from school libraries.

The militarisation of the educational environment remained another key area. From 1 September, the occupying authorities [planned](#) to increase the share of military training for pupils in grades 6–11 under the subject entitled 'Fundamentals of Security and Defence of the Motherland' from 20% to 50% of instructional time. The curriculum included the study of unmanned aerial vehicles and practical field training. In Donetsk oblast, the occupying authorities also approved a ten-year plan for preparing citizens for military service and military-patriotic education, including training in military occupational specialities, the use of UAVs, and military engineering training.

3.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum affairs, holidays and their celebration

In temporarily occupied Henichesk, in the left-bank part of Kherson oblast, the occupying authorities [planned](#) to create a memorial complex dedicated to Soviet servicemen killed during the Second World War.



The so-called Governor of Kherson oblast, Volodymyr Saldo, issued an order to hold a competition to develop the project design. The complex, comprising monuments, mass graves, and public gardens, was to be sited in the western part of the city.

The creation of such a memorial forms part of a broader policy of replacing Ukraine's politics of memory with a Russian imperial-Soviet model. By creating new memorial spaces, the occupying authorities reinforce Russian interpretations of history and frame the occupied part of Kherson oblast as part of Russia's historical space. This contributes to the displacement of Ukrainian narratives from public space and deepens the symbolic divide between residents of the occupied areas and the rest of Ukraine.

II. FRONTLINE AND DE-OCCUPIED AREAS

(DNIPROPETROVSK, DONETSK, ZAPORIZHZHIA, MYKOLAIV, KHARKIV, KHERSON, AND CHERNIHIV OBLASTS)

1. Changes in the system of governance

Within the monitoring period, the system of governance in frontline areas remained generally stable and ensured continuity of community operations despite the deteriorating security situation. Security considerations increasingly shaped day-to-day governance decisions: evacuation measures were expanded, efforts to counter Russian attacks were strengthened, and the workload on public authorities and public utility services increased.

Personnel changes affected governance in some areas. On 16 July, [Vitalii Kim](#) left his post as Head of Mykolaiv OMA to become Minister for Veterans Affairs. First Deputy Head of Mykolaiv OMA Heorhii Reshetilov assumed temporary leadership of the oblast.

In Kherson oblast, personnel changes also took place at the community level in August. The President dismissed the heads of the [Ivanivka](#) and [Novovorontsovska](#) settlement military administrations. The changes took place against the backdrop of criminal proceedings involving officials, highlighting the need for closer oversight of public authorities. In Donetsk oblast, ongoing communication with residents remained important for maintaining effective governance. It also helped counter rumours about the evacuation of the oblast leadership and the possible loss of territory.

1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

>> UPDATE TO THE LIST OF TERRITORIES WHERE HOSTILITIES ARE (WERE) TAKING PLACE

On 21 August, the [List of territories where hostilities are \(were\) taking place](#) or temporarily occupied by the RF was updated. The changes reflected shifts in the security situation in communities and had practical implications for their functioning and residents' access to state support.

In Donetsk oblast, a number of population centres in the Toretsk and Hrodivka communities were added to the List. Additional areas in the Kramatorsk, Sviatohirsk, and Sloviansk communities were classified as territories of active hostilities.

In Chernihiv oblast, the Sosnytsia, Kholmy, Berezna, Sedniv, and Tupyshiv communities were added to the List of territories of possible hostilities. Changes and clarifications also affected communities in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson oblasts.

>> SECURITY

The security situation in frontline communities continued to deteriorate, while the geographical reach of Russian attacks expanded. Russian attacks increasingly affected not only population centres directly along the front line but also areas previously considered relatively safe. In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, strikes on Nikopol and Synelnykove raions intensified, while Pavlohrad and Kryvyi Rih also came under heavy attack. The deteriorating security situation led to a further expansion of evacuation efforts. In Kharkiv oblast, systematic attacks began to be recorded in communities that had previously received significant numbers of IDPs, including the Sakhnovshchyna, Berestyn, and Valky territorial communities.

One way communities adapted to security threats was by modifying urban and transport infrastructure. In Kherson oblast, public transport routes were [reviewed](#) because of the threat of attacks, while safety requirements for filling stations were strengthened. On 15 July, a test version of an interactive drone threat map [was presented](#) in Kherson, based on more than 15,000 reports of attacks and data from over 150 locations. The map allows the intensity and nature of attacks to be taken into account when planning activities.

In Kharkiv oblast, authorities [planned to install](#) 99 mobile shelters along school bus routes. Communities identified the need for them based on routes used to transport schoolchildren. As of 24 August, the procurement process was under way, and the oblast had already received around UAH 80 million, or approximately EUR 1.53 million at the NBU exchange rate as of 24 August 2026, in subventions from Zakarpattia and Chernivtsi oblasts. However, these funds were insufficient to finance the project in full.

In [Mykolaiv](#), access to shelters during attacks remained a problem. After an incident in which residents were unable to enter a shelter during an attack, the police opened an investigation. In [Pavlohrad](#), Dnipropetrovsk oblast, residents raised concerns about the insufficient number of shelters. An electronic petition calling for an inspection of existing protective structures and the installation of additional modular shelters reached the number of signatures required for official consideration by the local authorities in less than three days.

Security risks also increasingly affected economic activity. In Mykolaiv oblast, attacks on port, industrial, transport, and energy infrastructure created additional risks for businesses involved in maritime logistics and increased their logistics and insurance costs.

As a result, communities increasingly had to adapt their infrastructure and adjust governance decisions in response to prolonged attacks and the constant threat of further strikes.

>> EVACUATION

The deteriorating security situation in July–August led to a further expansion of civilian evacuations from frontline areas.

The cost of moving belongings remains a separate problem. In [Kramatorsk](#), Donetsk oblast, the worsening security situation has prompted removal companies to raise their rates or refuse to make trips to the city. Moving furniture, appliances, and personal belongings to another city costs at least UAH 35,000–40,000, with loading services charged separately at around UAH 600–700 per hour.

A significant proportion of residents continue to delay leaving. In the [Mykolaivka community](#) in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, evacuation teams visited 541 of the 570 families subject to evacuation over two days; ten families were still refusing to leave at that time. For some families, finding accommodation and arranging the move remain challenging.

In August, pressure on humanitarian resources increased. From 15 August, the Proliska humanitarian mission temporarily [suspended](#) 31 fare-free bus routes serving 12 communities in Chernihiv oblast, redirecting resources to evacuation efforts in Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

>> OPERATION OF LIFE-SUPPORT SYSTEMS

In July–August, life-support systems in frontline communities had to adapt continuously. In communities facing the greatest security risks, backup arrangements became essential to maintaining basic services, while relatively more stable cities continued to build additional capacity to keep energy, water supply, and heating infrastructure operating independently.

In Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, Donetsk oblast, prolonged power outages became more frequent because of damage to energy infrastructure. Points of Invincibility [were used](#) to support residents. As of late August, 55 were operating across the oblast, providing places where people could keep warm or use charging facilities. A further six were ready to open.

As the front moved closer to water intakes on the Siverskyi Donets River, cities in the north of the oblast began experiencing serious water supply problems. From [28 August](#), centralised water supply was suspended in several settlements in the Kramatorsk community, while supplies to central districts were significantly reduced. A similar situation developed in Sloviansk. To maintain access to water, the authorities organised water deliveries and relied heavily on wells that had been drilled in large numbers since the beginning of the full-scale invasion. The lack of centralised water supply posed additional difficulties for the population,

a substantial share of whom were older people who could find it difficult to access alternative water sources on their own.

In [Kharkiv oblast](#), Russian strikes on gas infrastructure left some communities without gas supply. Fuel supply also posed as a challenge. Following a 22 August strike on the last undamaged filling station in the [Zlatopil](#) community, the local authorities began negotiating with operators over alternative ways to supply fuel. One option under consideration was delivery and sale through mobile fuel dispensing units. Some filling stations in the community were already limiting overnight operations.

In [Zaporizhzhia](#), strengthening the resilience of life-support systems became one of the priorities in the city's preparations for the autumn–winter period. Under the city's Comprehensive Resilience Plan, more than UAH 286 million, or approximately EUR 5.58 million as of 1 August 2026, from a state subvention was allocated to protecting water supply and heating facilities. Of this amount, UAH 225 million, or approximately EUR 4.39 million, was earmarked to strengthen two water supply stations that provide more than 99% of drinking water in the Ukrainian government-controlled part of the oblast. A further UAH 56.7 million, or approximately EUR 1.11 million, was allocated to protect three boiler houses, while UAH 4.5 million, or approximately EUR 87,800, went towards reconstructing a boiler house and installing a gas-piston cogeneration unit. The unit was intended to keep the boiler house operational even during blackouts.

In [Mykolaiv](#), reconstruction of wastewater treatment facilities continued, helping restore long-term infrastructure capacity.

In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, infrastructure across the oblast generally remained operational, but in frontline areas it remained unstable because of repeated attacks and the need for continuous emergency repairs. Electricity grids and water supply systems were under the greatest strain.

In Chernihiv oblast, despite the continuing threat of attacks on border areas, life-support systems operated reliably in most communities. The [Chernihiv community](#) received 17 generators for critical infrastructure enterprises and social facilities, helping maintain energy autonomy.

>> HEALTH SYSTEM RESILIENCE

In [Druzhkivka](#), Donetsk oblast, the Central City Clinical Hospital was to cease operations from 7 September. The decision followed a sharp deterioration in the security situation and the loss of basic utilities.

Some health services were also being scaled back in Kramatorsk. The blood transfusion station in Kramatorsk [ceased operations](#) on 10 August, while the cardiovascular centre and the radiology department at the Medical Center for Modern Methods of Oncology Treatment [temporarily suspended operations](#) from 1 August. Surgery at the oncology centre was suspended after medical facilities were damaged and some staff left, although consultations, examinations, outpatient surgery, chemotherapy, and the dispensing of medicines continued. Surgical services also [continued to be provided](#) at other sites after the city hospital's surgical building was damaged. Health care facilities in Sloviansk continued to operate as usual.

Access to pharmacy services was also affected. In August, the Zdravytsia pharmacy chain announced the [closure](#) of one pharmacy in Kramatorsk and three in Sloviansk. Medicines nevertheless remained generally available through local pharmacy chains and independent pharmacies.

Supplies to frontline health facilities were another vulnerable area for the health system. A [WHO warehouse](#) in Dnipro was struck on 3 and 7 August and was ultimately destroyed. It contained around 300 pallets of medical supplies for frontline health facilities, worth approximately USD 500,000. Before the warehouse was destroyed, 130 pallets had been moved.

In Dnipro, WHO also [assessed the preparedness](#) of Mechnikov Regional Clinical Hospital using the Hospital Safety Index. According to WHO, preparedness measures had already proved their value following an attack on the hospital in May 2026. Backup power and water systems helped maintain critical functions, while staff were able to move patients safely and continue providing essential health services despite damage and infrastructure disruptions.

In Mykolaiv oblast, another area of health system adaptation was the [development](#) of mobile dental, prosthetic, and rehabilitation services. This reflected a gradual expansion in the ways health care was delivered to meet community needs.

In Chernihiv oblast, the rehabilitation and neurology departments at Koriukivka Central District Hospital were [reconstructed](#) with support from the Belgian development agency Enabel and funding of more than UAH 52 million, or approximately EUR 1.01 million as of 1 August 2026. During the first half of 2026, the two departments treated 350 patients.

>> TRANSPORT

The security situation increasingly affected transport arrangements in frontline communities. In [Kramatorsk](#), Donetsk oblast, the public transport timetable was changed from late August because of the threat of attacks at dawn and dusk. Most services operated between 06:00 and 17:00.

In [Zaporizhzhia](#), attacks on locomotives and railway infrastructure led to changes in passenger rail services. Following strikes on 18–19 July, transfers were introduced on some services. Passengers travelling from Zaporizhzhia were taken to Dnipro by local trains or buses and continued their journeys from there by train. As of late July, direct rail services remained restricted on some routes, although tickets for those services were still on sale.

>> HOUSING RECOVERY

The need to restore housing and compensate owners for homes that have been damaged or destroyed remains one of the key humanitarian challenges facing frontline communities. In Donetsk oblast, more than 33,000 applications under the [eRecovery](#) programme were [approved](#), for a total of UAH 47.52 billion, or approximately EUR 926.8 million as of 1 August 2026. The oblast authorities continue to urge local administrations to process applications more actively, increase both commission membership and the frequency of meetings, make greater use of remote assessments, process technical reports more quickly, and issue housing certificates without delay.

Since the launch of the eRecovery programme, 73,456 applications for financial assistance to repair damaged housing have been submitted in Kharkiv oblast. The largest numbers came from Kharkiv city and Kharkiv, Chuhuiv, and Izium raions. As of 28 August, more than 49,800 applicants had [received](#) over UAH 5 billion, or approximately EUR 96.42 million at the NBU exchange rate as of 28 August 2026, for repairs, while almost 12,000 housing certificates had been issued for destroyed homes.

Pressure on local budgets is also increasing. Despite the eRecovery programme for owners of damaged and destroyed housing, Kharkiv [receives no](#) separate subventions from the state budget for reconstruction.

Changes in territorial status have also affected access to compensation. After the Kramatorsk community [was added](#) to the **List of territories where hostilities are (were) taking place**, applications were no longer accepted, and compensation payments for damaged property under the eRecovery programme were suspended from 21 August.

In [Mykolaiv oblast](#), the lack of properly registered ownership remains an additional barrier, particularly in rural areas, where some residents do not have the documents needed to prove ownership and are therefore unable to obtain compensation.

>> STRATEGIC PLANNING

In August, communities stepped up strategic planning to take account of wartime risks and prospects for post-war recovery. In Kherson, the Community Development Strategy to 2027, with an outlook to 2034, [was approved](#). The document provides for a phased transition from survival and stabilisation under wartime conditions to large-scale reconstruction, the return of residents, and economic recovery. The total funding required to implement the Strategy is [estimated](#) at UAH 187.3 billion, or approximately EUR 3.65 billion as of 1 August 2026, of which UAH 172.8 billion, or approximately EUR 3.37 billion, is required for infrastructure reconstruction and economic recovery. Only UAH 45.8 million, or approximately EUR 893,200, is expected to come from the city budget. The community expects to secure most of the funding from the state budget, international grants, and private investment.

In Chernihiv, a public consultation [was held](#) on the draft Community Development Strategy for 2027, with a longer-term outlook to 2034. Residents, businesses, young people, and the veteran community were involved in its preparation, while more than 2,000 residents took part in a survey on challenges and development

priorities. The Strategy is intended to serve as a basis for planning specific projects and securing government and international funding for recovery.

>> COUNTERING FAKE NEWS

Several notable cases of information manipulation involving Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih were recorded in August.

Between 17 and 19 August, a video from Dnipro railway station circulated on social media claiming that men liable for military service were barred from evacuating. Genuine footage was overlaid with an edited caption and an audio track mimicking an announcement over the station loudspeaker. On 20 August, the Center for Countering Disinformation [debunked](#) the claim, stressing that Dnipro was not in a mandatory evacuation zone and that Ukrainian law did not prohibit civilians liable for military service from evacuating.

Another case concerned fake [‘assistance from ATB’](#). Ahead of Independence Day, local Telegram channels circulated claims that free food packages, sweets for children, and UAH 1,000 vouchers were being offered. Users were urged to follow an external link and submit an application. No information about such a promotion had been published on the chain’s official channels, and reports that it was taking place were denied.

Both cases involved using issues of concern to the public, including evacuation, security, and material assistance, to spread false information or commit fraud. Anonymous local Telegram channels remain an important means of spreading such messages.

2. Work on identity

2.1. Changes in education standards

The education system continues to operate under wartime conditions. In relatively safer communities, in-person and blended learning are expanding, while distance learning remains the predominant format in frontline and border areas.

The war is also taking a toll on the education network. The situation in [Kramatorsk](#), Donetsk oblast, is illustrative. School enrolment has fallen by more than half, from 18,800 to 8,300 pupils, while only 15 of the 32 schools that operated before 2022 will operate in the new academic year. Some children are being transferred to other schools, while teaching is being suspended at some schools. These decisions have caused discontent among some residents.

Meanwhile, communities in Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv oblasts are expanding opportunities for in-person learning by equipping shelters, providing backup power, and arranging [transport for pupils](#). In [Zaporizhzhia oblast](#), 291 schools will operate in the 2026/2027 academic year, with 153 offering blended learning and 138 distance learning. In [Mykolaiv](#), 45 general secondary schools will operate in person, seven in a blended format, and 12 remotely. The learning format was determined by the security situation, shelter readiness, and schools’ capacity, and may be revised if the security situation deteriorates.

In [Dnipropetrovsk oblast](#), almost 300,000 children are expected to start the new academic year, including more than 17,000 first-graders. More than 85% of schools and preschools have shelters. All education institutions that will operate in person or in a blended format have backup power, and around 60% can operate autonomously for up to nine hours.

In [Chernihiv oblast](#), the school network is projected to shrink further to 300 schools. Most will nevertheless operate in person: 223 in person, 57 in a blended format, and 20 remotely. The oblast is also strengthening the energy autonomy of education institutions through generators, solar panels, and battery storage systems.

Distance learning remains in place in communities facing the greatest security risks, including Nikopol and Marhanets in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. In parts of Synelnykove raion, the evacuation of children from dangerous areas and damage to education facilities further complicate schooling.

The transition to a new model of specialised secondary education is also under way. From 1 September 2026, 150 academic lyceums across Ukraine are [piloting](#) the new model, which gives students a wider choice of pathways, courses, and individual subjects. Eight institutions in [Kharkiv oblast](#) have joined

the pilot and will switch to 12-year schooling from the 2026/2027 academic year. Full implementation of the reform is planned to begin in 2027.

Despite its proximity to the front, Kharkiv continues to play an important role as an education centre. In 2026 its higher education institutions [received](#) around 100,000 applications from prospective students, while more than 8,600 first-year students were [enrolled](#), more than in the previous year. Some prospective students choose to study in Kharkiv despite the security risks, while some institutions provide offer in-person classes in shelters.

2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum affairs, holidays and their celebration

Russian aggression continues to affect not only infrastructure but also cultural heritage. In early July, updated figures from the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine [were released](#). As of late June, 1,949 cultural heritage sites across Ukraine had been damaged or destroyed, including 46 that were completely destroyed. The largest numbers of damaged sites were recorded in areas that had experienced Russian occupation, notably Kharkiv, Kherson, Kyiv, Donetsk, and Odesa oblasts.

Efforts to document and preserve cultural heritage lost as a result of the war also continued. In [Kherson oblast](#), work began on a 3D reconstruction of the 18th-century Holy Presentation Church in Beryslav following its destruction on 1 August. Photos and videos of the church are being collected from residents' private archives.

In [Donetsk oblast](#), initiatives to preserve the memory of communities affected by the war continued. In August, the cultural and artistic project 'Soledar: The Salt of Our Memory' was completed, producing a video about the city's history, its salt industry, and residents' connection to Soledar.

Communities also continued to publicly commemorate fallen defenders.

3. Joint action

3.1. Cooperation at the community–authorities level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

In Kherson oblast, a gap persists between trust in public authorities and trust in civil society. According to a [survey](#), 54.8% of residents expressed little or no trust in local authorities or military administrations. The main reasons were insufficient direct dialogue and communication with residents (38.6%) and doubts about the completeness and reliability of official information (70.5%). By contrast, 78.9% rated the work of volunteers and charitable organisations positively, while 89.8% said that they or members of their families had personally received assistance from them. Against a backdrop of low trust in local authorities, trust in civil society remains high.

>> NEEDS OF WAR VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES

The development of a support system for war veterans and their families remains one aspect of interaction between residents and public authorities. Communities are expanding services and support mechanisms for veterans, ranging from rehabilitation, prosthetics, and housing programmes to vocational training, business start-up, and development support. In [Kharkiv](#), vouchers worth up to UAH 150,000 were introduced to help veterans start or develop businesses. A modern prosthetics workshop opened in [Dnipropetrovsk oblast](#). Work on a multifunctional veterans' space in [Kryvyi Rih](#) is nearing completion. In [Mykolaiv oblast](#), a subvention of UAH 177.4 million, or approximately EUR 3.46 million as of 1 August 2026, was allocated from the state budget to purchase housing for 71 veteran families.

Mechanisms for involving veterans and their representatives in local decision-making are also being developed. In [Mykolaiv](#), the Coordination Council on Veterans' Policy was reconstituted. A series of 24 [strategic sessions](#) was held across Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Poltava, Sumy, Kharkiv, Kherson, and Chernihiv oblasts to develop local plans and recommendations for veteran reintegration. Participants included representatives of local authorities and communities, veterans and veterans' organisations, family members of those killed, missing, or held as prisoners of war, and professionals from the social, health care, and legal sectors. A total of 675 people took part in the sessions.

>> **SUPPORT FOR ENTREPRENEURS AND ECONOMIC RESILIENCE OF COMMUNITIES**

The Dialogue Between Government and Business platforms continued to operate. In July and August, discussions covered export development, the search for new international markets, access to financial instruments, cyber resilience, and business recovery.

Communities and oblasts expanded access to financial instruments. In Zaporizhzhia, local businesses could receive reimbursement of 50% of the contribution paid to participate in the government war-risk insurance programme. In [Mykolaiv oblast](#), higher grant limits of up to UAH 500,000 were available under the Vlasna Sprava (Own Business) programme, while the BLOOM programme [continued](#), offering support of up to USD 30,000. A separate financial support programme for agricultural producers operated in Kharkiv oblast.

>> **AGRICULTURAL SECTOR**

Despite a strong harvest, farmers continue to face economic risks. In [Dnipropetrovsk oblast](#), producers reported a significant gap between domestic purchase prices and export prices. Factors cited included difficulties with export logistics and the rerouting of some grain shipments from the ports of Greater Odesa to western border crossings and Izmail, thereby increasing transport times and costs. In Kharkiv and Chernihiv oblasts, security risks remain an additional constraint: some agricultural land is inaccessible, while strikes on machinery and infrastructure disrupted farming operations. For the agricultural sector in frontline areas, the challenges extend beyond production to access to land, the ability to work safely, [product quality](#), and sales.

Staff shortages also persist. In Dnipropetrovsk oblast, DTEK [Pavlohradvuhillia](#) had more than 500 vacancies as of late August, covering both skilled trades and engineering and technical roles.

Russian attacks also continue to pose direct risks to industrial and agricultural enterprises.

>> **ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY AND PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT**

At the oblast level, the public is involved in shaping and implementing anti-corruption policy. A [public discussion](#) of the draft OMA Anti-Corruption Programme for 2026–2028 began in Dnipropetrovsk oblast. In Kharkiv, the City Council's Anti-Corruption Programme for 2026–2028 [was approved](#) on 29 July. The programme aims to identify and mitigate corruption risks and increase transparency in local government.

3.2. Cooperation at the societal level. Initiatives. Trust between groups

>> **VOLUNTEER AND CHARITABLE INITIATIVES**

In July and August, volunteer and charitable organisations continued to support people in frontline communities, service members, and their families. Following Russian shelling in [Pavlohrad](#), Dnipropetrovsk oblast, the Proliska team promptly provided affected residents with building materials. Its specialists also advised people on humanitarian assistance, the eRecovery programme, and submitting claims to the Register of Damage for Ukraine.

On 15 August, [Zaporizhzhia](#) hosted the charity fair 'Razom zarady Zakhysnykiv ta Zakhysnyts' (Together for Defenders), organised by the Families of the Fallen of Zaporizhzhia Region, a civil society organisation. The proceeds were used to support the 128th Separate Heavy Mechanized Brigade 'Wild Field'.

>> CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

In July, peaceful protests continued in Dnipro following the removal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. The first rally, held on 16 July, [drew](#) around 300 people, and protests continued over the following days. Although turnout gradually declined, the protests reflected a fairly high level of civic engagement in the oblast.

>> TRAINING AND SELF-ORGANISATION

In Kherson, a safety training course for heads of homeowner associations (HOAs) and neighbourhood committee representatives from areas regularly affected by shelling [was completed](#). It covered drone and mine safety, firefighting, and first aid, equipping participants to respond to emergencies and pass on what they learned to residents of their buildings and neighbourhoods.

>> DIFFERENT VIEWS OF WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE DURING WARTIME

On 23 August, spontaneous City Day celebrations took place in [Kharkiv](#) despite the absence of official large-scale events. The celebrations prompted mixed reactions from residents, veterans, volunteers, and civic activists. Some saw them as part of maintaining everyday life, while others criticised their format and scale during wartime. The episode highlighted differing views within the community about acceptable forms of public life during wartime.

4. Changes in the social structure

>> DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE

The deteriorating security situation and evacuations are exacerbating demographic challenges for frontline communities. One such challenge is retaining young professionals and the working-age population. The Kherson Youth: A Generation of Resilience targeted social programme for 2027–2030 [was approved](#) in Kherson oblast. Around UAH 25 million, or approximately EUR 487,600 as of 1 August 2026, is to be allocated for its implementation, with around 80% earmarked for targeted financial assistance to young professionals.

4.1. Challenges related to the situation of women, children, and people with disabilities

Temporary accommodation centres for evacuees from Kherson oblast [were set up](#) in Kryvyi Rih and Mykolaiv. They provide shelter for families with children, older people, people with limited mobility, and other evacuees, offering free accommodation for up to 21 days and comprehensive support.

In July, children from Kharkiv oblast continued to travel to other oblasts of Ukraine and abroad for rest and recreation through interregional and international partnerships. [100 children](#) returned after a stay in Lviv oblast, while [more than 80](#) returned from summer holidays in Poland organised through a partnership between Kharkiv OMA and the Greater Poland Voivodeship.

In Mykolaiv, the Mykolaiv Oblast Centre for Social Services and the charitable organisation Positive Women Mykolaiv [signed](#) a memorandum of cooperation to provide women with comprehensive social, psychological, and paralegal assistance. They also agreed to refer women to Barrier-Free Access Rooms and the Safe Space for Women.

In Mykolaiv, experts from the Ukrainian Association of Business Support Centers, with support from the Mykolaiv City War Veterans Support Centre, [held](#) focus groups with people with disabilities and veterans on barriers to employment. The discussions will inform recommendations on support programmes and employer training aimed at creating a more inclusive work environment.

4.2. Needs of displaced persons. Response

Increased displacement and pressure on reception services. In July and August, increased evacuation from frontline communities placed additional pressure on IDP reception services. In [Pavlohrad](#), Dnipropetrovsk oblast, more than 6,700 people passed through the transit centre in July. As of 20 August, more than 1,900 people had passed through the centre that month. It was receiving an average of 100 to 120 people a day. More than 90% of evacuees were residents of frontline communities in Dnipropetrovsk oblast.

Access to housing. Housing remains one of the key challenges for IDPs, while new waves of displacement are increasing demand for rental accommodation. Rising rents and a shortage of affordable housing make it harder for displaced people to settle long term and integrate into host communities. Regional monitoring findings indicate that purchasing housing with eRecovery housing certificates remains a particular problem: IDPs report cases of sellers raising housing prices when payment is made with a certificate.

Limited access to affordable housing may also influence whether residents of dangerous areas decide to evacuate, particularly older people and those living alone, for whom rent is a significant financial burden.

New reception and accommodation arrangements. In [Kharkiv oblast](#), the Poruch electronic system was launched to coordinate evacuation and accommodation for IDPs. The system digitises the work of transit centres in Kharkiv and Lozova, allowing people to review temporary accommodation conditions and reserve a place before evacuation. According to Kharkiv OMA, after a two-week trial, the number of people agreeing to evacuate increased by 73%.

IDP integration and participation in community life. IDP participation in host community life is gradually increasing. In the [Solone community](#), Dnipropetrovsk oblast, the IDP Council discussed the needs of displaced people and mechanisms for implementing the housing programme.

Working groups on housing, employment, and communications were set up in Dnipro following changes to the membership of Dnipro's IDP Council. This reflects longer-term needs, with housing, jobs, and integration into the community becoming increasingly important, rather than emergency assistance alone.

Employment and economic integration. In [Dnipropetrovsk oblast](#), 6,533 IDPs used employment service programmes in the first half of the year. With the service's assistance, 3,143 people found jobs, 629 were referred for vocational training, and a further 108 received training vouchers. 33 IDPs received microgrants to start or develop their own businesses.

4.3. Mobilisation processes. Response

In July and August, public confrontations involving notification teams became more frequent in [Dnipropetrovsk oblast](#). At least three high-profile incidents in Dnipro, Kryvyi Rih, and Kamianske came to public attention. They involved fights, the use of pepper spray, and gunfire. The number of complaints to the oblast office of the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights about TRSSC actions also increased, including those concerning possible abuse of authority.

Conflicts involving notification teams were also reported in [Kharkiv oblast](#). In 2026, 23 TRSSC employees were injured, and one service member was killed. Police opened criminal proceedings in connection with the attacks.

III. RELATIVELY REAR AREAS CONTROLLED BY THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT

(VINNYTSIA, ZAKARPATTIA, LVIV, ODESA, AND CHERNIVTSI OBLASTS)

1. Changes in the system of governance

In July and August, personnel changes took place in the executive authorities of several relatively rear areas. In Zakarpattia, OMA Deputy Head [Rostyslav Pritsak](#), who was responsible for infrastructure, was dismissed.

In Odesa, changes to the city executive team included the appointment of three deputy mayors: [Olena Yakymenko](#), [Andrii Makovetskyi](#), and [Oleksii Botezat](#). Each will be responsible for a designated area of city administration.

1.1. Decisions of authorities that affected cohesion

Within the monitoring period, the political and social situation in the target oblasts remained generally stable. Public authorities and local self-government bodies focused on strengthening regional security, developing international cooperation, supporting veterans and IDPs, preparing communities for the autumn and winter period, and implementing investment and recovery projects.

>> CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENERGY RESILIENCE

Preparations continued in relatively rear areas to ensure that critical infrastructure was ready for the autumn and winter periods and possible disruptions to energy supplies. In [Vinnytsia](#), solar power plants with energy storage systems are being installed at municipal infrastructure facilities with support from GIZ. A new plant is to be commissioned before the start of the 2026–2027 heating season.

[Lviv](#) is implementing its [Resilience Plan](#), approved in March 2026. It includes 96 projects covering critical infrastructure protection, backup power, and additional heat and water supply capacity. As of August, more than 52% of the planned measures had been implemented.

After large-scale attacks in August, power outages in Odesa also affected water supplies and mobile communications. The city also faced the challenge of [preparing](#) for possible water shortages caused by the combined effects of wartime risks, hot weather, and falling river levels. The city approved a contingency plan for water supply disruptions, including backup generators and reserves of fuel and water.

>> SECURITY

In July, Lviv oblast tightened oversight of shelter conditions following monitoring. Communities [were instructed](#) to address the shortcomings identified and ensure that shelters were properly maintained. In August, the oblast launched an unscheduled inspection of its entire shelter network, covering more than 7,500 facilities and involving SESU, the police, raion military administrations, and communities. The inspections are due to be completed by 1 October.

[Lviv](#) also considered bringing privately owned shelters near busy public places into municipal ownership. Only 34 of the 71 privately owned shelters were being used for their intended purpose. The city plans to identify, with the involvement of SESU, Lviv City Council, and the owners, which facilities the municipality could take over.

In Bukovyna, authorities [checked](#) whether school shelters were ready for the new academic year. A total of 579 shelters are in use across 331 general secondary schools. As the schools do not have enough shelters of their own, 208 facilities are used under agreements. In-person learning was planned at 315 schools and blended learning at 16. Blended learning will be used, in particular, where shelters cannot accommodate all pupils at the same time. In 2026, only two of the 15 institutions that applied received a state subvention to equip shelters.

On 19 August, Lviv oblast [held](#) a command and staff exercise on responding to missile and drone attacks, prolonged power outages, and disruptions to life-support systems. Participants practised coordination between public authorities, SESU, the police, and the National Guard. The exercise also covered assessing the consequences of damage to energy facilities, rapid decision-making, and public warning procedures.

>> INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

In July and August, international cooperation in relatively rear areas developed along several lines, ranging from institutional representation and cross-border partnerships to practical support for urban infrastructure.

[Bukovyna](#) strengthened its representation at the European level. On 2 July, Chernivtsi oblast opened its own representative office at the European Committee of the Regions in Brussels, becoming the sixth Ukrainian oblast with such representation. The office is intended to facilitate direct engagement with European regions, attract grants and investment, and support cross-border, infrastructure, energy, and other projects. The official opening of the Brussels office is scheduled for October.

Chernivtsi Oblast Council members also endorsed the oblast's intention to join the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation EAST GATE, which brings together regions from Ukraine, Romania, Moldova, and Bulgaria.

On 6 July, an agreement was signed in [Zakarpattia](#) to establish the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation 'Vihorlat' with Slovakia's Prešov and Košice self-governing regions. The new framework is intended to facilitate joint cross-border projects and attract European funding.

Freiburg, Lviv's German twin city, [joined](#) the UNBROKEN Cities Network in August. The network was established by Lviv to promote international cooperation among cities on rehabilitation and support for veterans and people affected by the war.

In [Odesa](#), international assistance focused on strengthening the city's infrastructure. In August, municipal utility companies received eight high-pressure sewer-cleaning vehicles from Japan, one for each of the city's municipal housing and communal services enterprises.

Cross-border cooperation was also beginning to take the form of practical infrastructure projects. In [Bukovyna](#), negotiations were under way on reopening the Shepit–Izvoarele Sucevei border crossing, while work continued to restore the Porubne–Siret cross-border power line, which is intended to provide backup electricity supplies to the oblast from Romania. In [Vinnytsia oblast](#), construction continued on a bridge across the Dniester on the route to the future Yampil–Cosăuți border crossing.



Construction of the new bridge in Vinnytsia oblast between Ukraine and Moldova
The source is [This is Vinnytsia, mate.](#)

>> TRANSPORT AND LOGISTICS CHALLENGES

In Odesa oblast, the Danube logistics route [faced increased risks](#). Following strikes on the ports of Izmail and Reni, a record-low water level in the Danube further complicated the situation, forcing vessels to carry less cargo. Diverting some cargo flows to Danube ports is also increasing pressure on port, rail, and road infrastructure and driving up transport costs.

Amid disruptions at Black Sea ports, Maersk [launched](#) a temporary rail service via Constanța. This broadens the scope for using alternative logistics routes and strengthens Constanța's role as a backup hub for Ukrainian cargo.

Increased cargo flows through Danube ports have already affected transport costs. According to the Institute of Danube Research, freight rates from Danube ports have [risen](#) by around USD 5 per tonne. The Danube route helps partly offset restrictions on Black Sea port operations but is itself constrained by security risks, natural conditions, and logistical limitations.

>> INTERREGIONAL COOPERATION

On 3 August, the heads of mountain territorial communities from Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Zakarpattia oblasts met in Ivano-Frankivsk during a session of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities. The discussion covered road conditions, transport links, access to health care and education services, tourism development, and communities' financial capacity. [Representatives of Bukovyna](#) also raised the issues of flood protection and reopening border crossings with Romania.

On 19 August in Lutsk, [representatives](#) of the Association [Euroregion Carpathians – Ukraine association](#), which brings together communities across the Carpathian region, discussed with the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine the idea of creating a macro-regional grouping, expanding cross-border partnerships, and establishing a Community Development Academy. The initiative provides for the digital collection and analysis of data on community needs, group training, and expert support to develop and implement practical solutions.

>> BUSINESS RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT

In [Vinnytsia](#), Vinnytsiapobutkhim resumed operations on all its production lines following privatisation. The company employs 89 people, with another 13 vacancies still open. Production volumes tripled in the first four months of 2026. In 2026, the company has already invested UAH 8.2 million, or approximately EUR 159,900 as of 1 August 2026, in its development and in restoring operations, including more than UAH 4 million, or approximately EUR 78,000, in employee safety and equipping a shelter. Next year, the company plans to install equipment to generate electricity from renewable sources.

The Bakery Food Investment plant in [Khust](#), Zakarpattia oblast, officially opened on 3 August. Investment in the plant totalled UAH 400 million, or approximately EUR 7.80 million at the NBU exchange rate as of 3 August 2026. Its products are already exported to 15 countries.

2. Work on identity

2.1. Changes in education standards

Ukraine is moving towards a model in which students in grades 10–12 attend separate academic lyceums instead of following an overloaded curriculum of 15–20 subjects. At these lyceums, students can choose which subjects to study in greater depth in line with their future aspirations. [Lviv](#) authorities approved an updated plan for the lyceum network, setting out the stages of the transition to the new upper secondary school structure and plans to stop admitting students to grades 1 and 10 at institutions whose status is changing. In Lviv, [five schools](#) were preparing to take part in the pilot phase of the reform, which is due to begin in September.

In Bukovyna, Chernivtsi Oblast Council expanded the network of academic lyceums from 59 to 65 institutions. The city council's plan to gradually merge the secondary school No. 20 with Lyceum No. 8 has caused concern among parents. On 6 July, the City Council rejected an [electronic petition](#) to keep the school as a separate legal entity.

Modernising vocational education remained a separate focus. Vinnytsia oblast [received](#) more than UAH 16 million, or approximately EUR 312,000 as of 1 August 2026, under the government's [100 Workshops](#) project to modernise workshops, laboratories, and classrooms, purchase modern equipment, and create energy-efficient, barrier-free learning environments at four vocational education institutions.

2.2. Politics of memory: place names, museum affairs, holidays and their celebration

Alleys of Glory and Alleys of Hope remained among the main forms of commemoration in communities. The former honour fallen service members, while the latter commemorate those who remain missing or held captive, and whose families continue to await their return. In Bukovyna, an Alley of Hope [was opened](#) in the village of Repuzhyntsi in the Kadubivtsi community. The memorial display included 17 portraits of service members.

On 1 July, a stele entitled 'Alley of Hope' was [unveiled](#) in Lviv in memory of officers of the Special Purpose Police Battalion of the Main Directorate of the National Police in Lviv Oblast who went missing while defending Ukraine.

On 23 August, a [mobile installation](#) entitled 'Columns of Memory' was installed in Angels' Square in Lviv. It already bears the names of more than 2,000 service members who fell defending Ukraine and are buried within the Lviv community. Further names can be added.



[Columns of Memory in Lviv](#)

In Chernivtsi oblast, the renaming of place names reflecting communist and imperial legacies continued. On 7 August, 22 streets and lanes were [renamed](#) across five communities. The decisions followed public consultation and expert input from the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance.

2.3. Freedom of religion

In July and August, religious issues in Bukovyna centred primarily on church events, the legal status of religious sites, and court cases.

On 3–5 July, Epiphanius of Kyiv, Primate of the OCU, [visited](#) the Chernivtsi-Bukovyna Eparchy. The visit included the glorification of Yevhenii (Hakman), Archbishop of Chernivtsi and 19th-century Metropolitan of Bukovyna and Dalmatia. The Holy Synod of the OCU had approved his canonisation in May 2026. The hierarch is revered for his role in preserving and developing Ukrainian church and cultural life in Bukovyna under the Austrian Empire.

On 27 August, the Chernivtsi District Prosecutor's Office applied to the court over the legal status of [St Nicholas Church](#), an architectural monument of national significance more than 400 years old. No protection agreement has been concluded for the church, and the Prosecutor's Office is seeking formal registration of state ownership of the monument. The Chernivtsi Circuit Administrative Court opened proceedings in the case.

In the case of [Metropolitan Longin of Bancheny](#) (Mykhailo Zhar), a hierarch of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (UOC), a hearing scheduled for 12 August at Hertsya District Court was postponed because he was receiving medical treatment in Romania. Proceedings in the case, which was referred to court in 2023, remain ongoing. Longin, who was awarded the title Hero of Ukraine in 2008 for his charitable work and for raising hundreds of orphans and children deprived of parental care in a monastery-run shelter, faces charges of inciting religious hatred.

2.4. National minorities

On 13 July, Dmytro Lubinets, Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, and his Hungarian counterpart, Imre Juhász, [agreed](#) to conduct reciprocal monitoring visits to assess respect for national minority rights. In Ukraine, the monitoring is expected to cover schools and kindergartens and include meetings with representatives of the Hungarian community; a similar visit is planned in Hungary. The two sides also agreed to establish a standing working group to respond to possible rights violations. According to the Ukrainian Ombudsman, his Office had received no complaints in 2026 from members of the Hungarian minority concerning violations of their rights. In Zakarpattia, 12,975 students are taught in Hungarian at 91 educational institutions.

How Hungarian-language secondary education would operate under the upper secondary school reform remained a separate issue. Representatives of the Hungarian community expressed concern about the future of [Chop Lyceum](#), named after István Széchenyi. Initially, a decision by Chop City Council provided that the school would no longer admit students to grade 10, which would effectively have changed its status to that of a gymnasium serving grades 5–9. Following appeals from parents, the City Council [revised](#) its earlier decision and allowed admissions to grade 10 for the 2026/2027 academic year. For the Hungarian community, the issue is particularly sensitive because it is about more than administrative reorganisation. The lyceum is the only institution in the city where Hungarian-speaking children can complete secondary education in their native language. If the lyceum were to lose its upper grades, students would have to travel elsewhere for grades 10–12, potentially to places where Hungarian-language education is unavailable.

Hungarian cultural and educational institutions also continued to receive support from Hungary. At a [graduation ceremony](#) at Ferenc Rakoczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian University, László Vida, Head of the Consulate of Hungary in Berehove, said that Hungary would continue to support the Hungarian community in Zakarpattia.

3. Joint action

3.1. Cooperation at the community–authorities level. Trust in decisions of authorities. Response to the needs, business and civic initiatives

>> AID FOR THE AFU

Support for the Defence Forces remained one of the areas in which local authorities, communities, businesses, and charitable organisations worked together. In Lviv oblast, communities continued to allocate funds for military needs. The education sector was also actively involved in the effort: during the 2025–2026 academic year, pupils, parents, and staff at schools, kindergartens, and out-of-school educational institutions [raised](#) UAH 45.6 million, or approximately EUR 889,300 as of 1 August 2026, for drones, vehicles, and other equipment for the AFU. Communities in Bukovyna and Vinnytsia oblast also continued to provide the military with drones, vehicles, communications equipment, and other essential supplies.

>> NEEDS OF WAR VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES

Support for war veterans and their families included the development of dedicated spaces, rehabilitation, housing programmes, and measures to promote economic self-reliance. In Bukovyna, 31 families of war veterans and fallen service members [will receive housing](#). Almost UAH 89 million, or approximately EUR 1.74 million, was allocated under the programme. [Veterans' hearings](#) were held in the Kitsman community, where participants discussed access to rehabilitation, social support, pensions and benefits, psychological support for children of service members, and the commemoration of fallen service members.



In Vinnytsia oblast, the GARTA Prosthetics and Adaptation Centre [began operating](#) to provide pre-prosthetic preparation, prosthetic fitting, and rehabilitation. The Centre also helps people adjust to using a prosthesis and return to everyday life.

In Vinnytsia, war veterans continued to call for representation in local self-government bodies. At an extraordinary City Council session on 14 July, they called for the veteran community to be represented on the Executive Committee. The same demand had been raised at the previous session in April.

In Lviv oblast, rehabilitation and social programmes for war veterans and their families continued to expand in August. As part of several programmes, war veterans and their family members took part in rehabilitation trips and family retreats. On 6 August, a new building at the UNBROKEN rehabilitation centre [opened](#) in Lviv, with facilities for physical and occupational therapy, rooms for psychological support, and a teaching building for the medical school.

In Odesa oblast, the first veterans' forum [was held](#), focusing on support for war veterans and their families. Participants discussed the needs of the veteran community and cooperation with public authorities.

>> SUPPORT FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES

In July and August, business support programmes continued to operate, including grants, interest-rate compensation, and vouchers. Entrepreneurs also raised issues relating to access to support, rules governing small businesses, and staff shortages.

On 3 July, businesses in Lviv oblast affected by the war were [briefed](#) on financial assistance, war-risk insurance, grant programmes, and concessional lending. By then, at least 96 business premises had been damaged. In the 11th round of the Vlasna Sprava programme, 57 entrepreneurs [received](#) government financial support to start or expand their businesses. Among them were six successful applicants under the grant programme for veterans and their spouses.

In Vinnytsia oblast, the programme providing interest-rate compensation on investment loans to small and medium-sized businesses [continued to operate](#). In July, 51 businesses with 97 loans were added to the register; total compensation amounted to nearly UAH 5 million, or approximately EUR 97,500 as of 1 August 2026. The recipients included 19 businesses that had employed 153 war veterans and combatants.

In Odesa, [debate was ongoing](#) over new rules governing the placement of temporary structures. At a public consultation on 24 July, representatives of small businesses raised concerns about the proposal to allocate new sites through open auctions, fearing that large chains could outbid smaller firms. The consultation ended without agreement on the proposed auction system, and the draft decision was sent back for revision.

In Zakarpattia, a study of labour-market needs [identified](#) staff shortages. Employers reported the greatest demand for electricians, electrical installers, and power engineers, as well as workers in metalworking and mechanical engineering, including turners, fitters, CNC machine operators, and welders.

3.2. Cooperation at the societal level. Initiatives. Trust between groups

>> PUBLIC PROTESTS

The removal of Defence Minister Mykhailo Fedorov on 16 July prompted protests in [Lviv](#), [Vinnytsia](#), and [Odesa](#). Participants called for his reinstatement and later also raised the issues of the dismissal of Oleksandr Syrskyi, Commander-in-Chief of the AFU, and greater transparency in personnel decisions. In Odesa, the protests continued throughout August. They drew around 100 people on 16 July, with attendance [rising](#) to more than 1,000 over the following days.

The protests remained peaceful for more than a month, with no recorded clashes or forcible dispersals, indicating that people remained able to express their civic views publicly. However, the protesters' dissatisfaction did not subside after the appointment of a new minister. Trust between the authorities and part of civil society therefore remained an ongoing issue.

>> PRAYER BREAKFASTS

Prayer breakfasts were held in [Vinnytsia oblast](#) and [Bukovyna](#), bringing together representatives of public authorities, the clergy, the military, volunteers, and the business community. The events combined cross-sector dialogue with charitable fundraising in support of the military, health care institutions, and people affected by the war.

>> CIVIC INITIATIVES

In the Chornomorsk community in Odesa oblast, residents [initiated an appeal](#) calling for safe transport links between population centres within the community. In July, the initiative received the support of 1,095 residents. The collective appeal was sent to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the Ministry for Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, and the relevant committee of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

4. Changes in the social structure

>> DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS

The [demographic situation](#) in the relatively rear oblasts remained unfavourable. In all five target oblasts, deaths outnumbered births. In Vinnytsia and Lviv oblasts, the number of births fell by approximately 20% year on year. Zakarpattia continued to have the narrowest gap between births and deaths.

4.1. Challenges related to the situation of women, children, and people with disabilities

In Lviv oblast, the Nadija project [is being developed](#) as a centre for children affected by the war, offering psychological support, rehabilitation, and treatment. Plans also include a virtual hospital and an international research institute alongside the centre, intended to give children from across Ukraine access to modern medical care. The Lviv community also [continued](#) targeted assistance for children of fallen defenders of Ukraine and children of persons with war-related group I disabilities. A further 76 children are to receive UAH 50,000 each for education and health-related needs.

Short-term recreation and psychological recovery for children from frontline areas remained a separate area of support. Under the [Carpathian Shift](#) programme, [Lviv oblast](#) and [Bukovyna](#) hosted children from Sumy, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts.

In Lviv, work [continued to improve](#) accessibility in residential buildings: 37 wheelchair platform lifts had been installed since the beginning of the year, with almost as many planned by year-end. In Uzhhorod, problems with the physical accessibility of urban space [persisted](#): high kerbs, poorly designed ramps, a lack of tactile paving, and the absence of audible signals at traffic lights. The city authorities are developing a barrier-free route from Maria Zankovetska Street to Poshtova Square and assessing the accessibility of facilities along it.

In the first half of 2026, the Barrier-Free Odesa city target programme [received](#) less than 10% of its planned funding. The City Council nevertheless extended the programme and provided for further funding, including for ramps, lifts, and other accessibility features. Ultimate oversight of funding, implementation, and approval of amendments to the programme rests with Odesa City Military Administration.

The situation of women and efforts to combat domestic violence also remained on the agenda. At a women's forum in Bukovyna, participants [discussed](#) women's political participation and efforts to combat gender-based violence. In Vinnytsia oblast, 1,277 reports of domestic violence were [recorded](#) in 2026, including 270 from minors. Odesa oblast recorded 1,284 reports, the second-highest figure in Ukraine after Dnipropetrovsk oblast with 2,216. The figures cover the first months of 2026 and were entered in the Unified State Register of Cases of Domestic Violence and Gender-Based Violence.

4.2. Needs of displaced persons. Response

In July and August, housing remained one of the main needs of IDPs. Both temporary and long-term housing solutions continued to be developed. In [Bukovyna](#), communities were asked to identify buildings suitable for conversion into housing for IDPs. The Nedoboivtsi community [planned](#) to renovate a dormitory, while displaced people from Mariupol were provided with [social housing](#) in Chernivtsi. In [Vinnytsia oblast](#), preparations were under way for a pilot project to purchase housing for IDPs in rural areas. In Lviv oblast, authorities continued to issue [housing vouchers](#) and [provide compensation](#) for interest on concessional mortgage loans.

Housing programmes, however, reached only a proportion of displaced people. In Zakarpattia, housing affordability remained a major challenge because of the [high cost](#) of buying and renting homes, coupled with the large number of displaced people living in the oblast. Temporary accommodation facilities also continued to operate: there were [69](#) in Lviv oblast and [105](#) in Zakarpattia.

As large numbers of displaced people remained in host communities for extended periods, the need for mutual adaptation became more apparent. In Zakarpattia, some public discussions contrasted locals with newcomers. Such remarks are not representative of attitudes across the oblast, but they may point to a risk of rising tensions as high housing costs and sustained pressure on local infrastructure persist.

4.3. Mobilisation processes. Response

Mobilisation remained one of the most sensitive issues. Public tension continued to be fuelled by reports of possible violations during mobilisation activities, corruption and other alleged misconduct within the TRSSC system, and incidents of aggression by civilians towards service members.

Reports of possible violations by TRSSC personnel attracted considerable public attention. In [Zakarpattia](#), the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights said he had received repeated complaints from citizens about the methods used by TRSSCs and called for a large-scale review of their activities in the oblast.

In [Odesa oblast](#), the Ombudsman's Office received 453 complaints concerning the actions of TRSSC personnel since the beginning of 2026, the highest number among Ukraine's oblasts. In August, law enforcement agencies [reported](#) that ten service members from one district TRSSC were suspected in connection with incidents of violence and unlawful detention.

In [Bukovyna](#), the SBU reported that the former heads of Dnistrovskiy and Vyzhnytsia district TRSSCs were suspected of artificially inflating mobilisation-plan figures between January and March 2026.

There were also incidents of aggression against TRSSC personnel. In July, a conflict between civilians and TRSSC service members in [Lviv](#) escalated into a large-scale clash in which an official vehicle was damaged. In August, a TRSSC service member was fatally wounded during mobilisation activities in [Lviv](#), while four service members were wounded when shots were fired at TRSSC personnel in [Odesa](#). These incidents showed that tensions surrounding mobilisation remained high.

Questions also arose over [employee reservation](#) practices. Following an inspection in Chernivtsi, a city council oversight commission reported possible irregularities and insufficient transparency in employee reservation at some municipal enterprises. The commission decided to refer its findings to law enforcement authorities for review.


Attempts by men liable for military service to leave the country illegally also remained an issue in border oblasts. Law enforcement agencies uncovered schemes facilitating illegal border crossings in [Bukovyna](#), [Zakarpattia](#), and [Odesa oblasts](#).

Voluntary recruitment was also expanding, with new recruitment centres for military units opening in [Chernivtsi](#).

DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

Conceptual framework for the approach adopted by the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion

RESILIENCE means a social practice at the national, oblast, and local levels that offers opportunities to overcome challenges and adapt to transformations.



We consider resilience in terms of the following three dimensions:

- **adaptive capacity** of social systems and institutions to crises and sudden environmental changes,
- **self-recovery** that means mobilisation of citizens, institutions to jointly solve various humanitarian, social, and security tasks,
- **resistance** means stabilisation of models of cooperation between the government, business community, and civil society which contributes to increasing the level of cross-sectoral trust in the course of transformation.

SOCIAL COHESION means the state of relationships in society between social groups (horizontal cohesion) and between society and the authorities (vertical cohesion). It is measured by the levels of trust and norms of reciprocity (development of positive social capital); the strength of civil society; and conflict management institutions being in place (e.g., responsible democracy, independent judiciary, etc.).

RESILIENCE AND SOCIAL COHESION ARE BASED on common approaches, shared values, and versatile models of cooperation.

>> **FOCUS:**

on actors, changes in governance, assessment of vulnerability, adaptive capacity, and transformation as opposed to return to the previous state.

>> **DATA COLLECTION:**

- temporarily occupied and frontline areas – Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Kharkiv, and Chernihiv oblasts,
- Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place – Vinnytsia, Odesa, Lviv, Zakarpattia, and Chernivtsi oblasts.

DATA SOURCES: publications in the media, decisions of authorities, draft decisions of authorities, public opinion survey data, data from social networking sites, reports of non-governmental organisations, and any other publicised information. The data are collected by coordinators of the National Platform for Resilience and Social Cohesion in 12 oblasts, based on data sources, their own understanding of the state of affairs and involvement in local cohesion processes.

>> PROBLEMS

In the temporarily occupied areas:

- **Dynamics of occupation.** The advance of Russian troops, the situation in occupied population centres; opinions of the population of the oblast / community / political forces regarding Russia's occupation and military actions.
- **Changes in the system of governance.** Decisions and information of the occupying authorities; cases of collaborationism; seizure of property; expropriation of products by the occupying administrations.
- **Humanitarian situation.** Filtration measures of the occupying authorities; forced deportation and its routes; hostage taking; recruitment into armed formations; nature of evacuation; destruction; access to health care services.
- **Work on identity.** The operation of educational facilities; relocation of school children, students, and teachers; forced Russification; Russian state education standards; politics of memory: place names, museum affairs, holidays and their celebration; activities of religious organisations.
- **Changes in the social structure.** Challenges related to the situation of women, children, and people with disabilities.

In the Ukrainian government-controlled areas where military operations are not taking place:

- **Dynamics of military operations.** Shelling and attacks / weapons used against the civilian population; destruction.
- **Changes in the system of governance.** The organisation of activities of authorities and citizens' access to decision-making at the local level; access to public information; coordination of actions of volunteers and authorities, as well as actions between authorities at a variety of levels, authorities and the military, volunteers and the military, etc.
- **Humanitarian situation.** The accessibility of drinking water, food, communication, electricity; access to health care services; provision of humanitarian assistance at the oblast level.
- **Changes in the social environment.** Attitudes in communities towards changes in symbols, calendars (holidays, memorial days); renaming of streets and other public places; operation of educational facilities, relocation of schoolchildren, students, and teachers; civil society and business community, labour market.
- **The situation of internally displaced persons.** The availability of housing and employment; integration into the host community; networking.

>> THE PUBLISHING FREQUENCY OF THE REPORT

The initial monitoring report covers the first four months of the large-scale invasion (from February through June), starting on 24 February 2022; the monitoring reports Nos. 2–9 have a two-month timeframe, while those beginning with Report No. 10 have a three-month timeframe; beginning with Report No. 15, the timeframe returns to two months.



ABOUT UKRAINIAN CENTER FOR INDEPENDENT POLITICAL RESEARCH

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RESILIENCE AND COHESION OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY DURING THE WAR

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